Taking the Stand: Access to Justice for Witnesses with Mental Disabilities in Sexual Assault Cases by Benedet, Janine & Grant, Isabel
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 50, Issue 1 (Fall 2012) Article 1
Taking the Stand: Access to Justice for Witnesses
with Mental Disabilities in Sexual Assault Cases
Janine Benedet
Isabel Grant
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons
Article
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Benedet, Janine and Grant, Isabel. "Taking the Stand: Access to Justice for Witnesses with Mental Disabilities in Sexual Assault Cases."
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 50.1 (2012) : 1-45.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol50/iss1/1
Taking the Stand: Access to Justice for Witnesses with Mental Disabilities
in Sexual Assault Cases
Abstract
In this article the authors argue that the existing adversarial trial process often prevents the stories of sexual
assault complainants with mental disabilities from being heard in court. Relying on social science evidence,
the authors argue that subjecting a woman with a mental disability to a rigorous cross-examination with
repeated and leading questions, in a manner that is confrontational and often accusatory, is probably the worst
way to get her story heard accurately in court. It is likely to unfairly undermine her credibility and to result in
unjustified acquittals or in prosecutors deciding not to pursue a case. The article examines the challenges
posed by traditional methods of cross-examination for witnesses with cognitive, developmental, or intellectual
disabilities that affect their ability to recall, process, and communicate information, suggesting that existing
Criminal Code accommodations are inadequate to address these concerns. Cross-examination should be
conducted in a way that respects both the right of the accused to a fair trial and the complainant’s right to sex
equality. Relying on developments in other jurisdictions, the authors recommend adopting a system of victim
support persons or intermediaries, which would allow witnesses with mental disabilities to have assistance in
understanding questions and in communicating their evidence to the court as fully as possible. Judges should
also be given explicit legislative authority to intervene to disallow questions that are inappropriate based on
the particular witness’s abilities. Such accommodations facilitate rather than impede the truth-seeking
function of a trial and are not inconsistent with the fair trial rights of the accused.
Keywords
Sex crimes--Trial practice; Legal assistance to sexual abuse victims; Cross-examination; Mental health laws;
Canada
This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol50/iss1/1
1Taking the Stand: Access to Justice for 
Witnesses with Mental Disabilities in 
Sexual Assault Cases
JANINE BENEDET * & ISABEL GRANT **
In this article the authors argue that the existing adversarial trial process often prevents the 
stories of sexual assault complainants with mental disabilities from being heard in court. Relying 
on social science evidence, the authors argue that subjecting a woman with a mental disability 
to a rigorous cross-examination with repeated and leading questions, in a manner that is 
confrontational and often accusatory, is probably the worst way to get her story heard accurately 
in court. It is likely to unfairly undermine her credibility and to result in unjustifi ed acquittals 
or in prosecutors deciding not to pursue a case. The article examines the challenges posed by 
traditional methods of cross-examination for witnesses with cognitive, developmental, or 
intellectual disabilities that affect their ability to recall, process, and communicate information, 
suggesting that existing Criminal Code accommodations are inadequate to address these 
concerns. Cross-examination should be conducted in a way that respects both the right of 
the accused to a fair trial and the complainant’s right to sex equality. Relying on developments 
in other jurisdictions, the authors recommend adopting a system of victim support persons 
or intermediaries, which would allow witnesses with mental disabilities to have assistance in 
understanding questions and in communicating their evidence to the court as fully as possible. 
Judges should also be given explicit legislative authority to intervene to disallow questions that 
are inappropriate based on the particular witness’s abilities. Such accommodations facilitate 
rather than impede the truth-seeking function of a trial and are not inconsistent with the fair 
trial rights of the accused.
Dans cet article, les auteurs font valoir que le processus contradictoire actuel des procès fait 
en sorte que la version des plaignantes d’agression sexuelle atteintes de défi cience mentale 
n’est souvent pas entendue par le tribunal. En se fondant sur l’enseignement des sciences 
sociales, les auteurs allèguent que le fait d’astreindre une femme atteinte de défi cience 
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mentale à un contre interrogatoire rigoureux comportant des questions insistantes et 
suggestives, de façon confl ictuelle et souvent accusatoire, est sans doute le pire moyen pour 
faire entendre sa version exacte devant le tribunal. Cela entachera probablement sa crédibilité 
de manière inéquitable et entraînera des acquittements injustifi és, ou fera en sorte que les 
procureurs décideront de ne pas donner suite à ce cas. Cet article se penche sur les défi s 
que posent les méthodes traditionnelles de contre interrogatoire des témoins atteints de 
défi ciences cognitives, développementales ou intellectuelles qui affectent leur capacité de se 
rappeler, traiter et communiquer des renseignements, et suggère que les dispositions 
actuelles du Code criminel sont inadéquates pour aborder ces problèmes. Le contre interroga-
toire devrait être mené d’une façon qui respecte le droit de l’accusé à un procès équitable et le 
droit de la plaignante à l’égalité des sexes. En se fondant sur de nouvelles méthodes utilisées 
ailleurs, les auteurs recommandent d’adopter un système faisant appel à des intermédiaires 
capables de  venir en aide aux victimes, ce qui permettrait aux témoins souffrant de défi cience 
mentale de mieux comprendre les questions et de communiquer de la manière la plus 
complète possible leur témoignage au tribunal. On devrait également légiférer spécifi quement 
pour accorder aux juges l’autorité de rejeter les questions inappropriées en raison des 
capacités intellectuelles du témoin. Plutôt que lui faire obstacle, de telles dispositions 
favoriseraient la recherche de la vérité, sans pour autant être incompatibles avec le droit de 
l’accusé à un procès équitable.
Mentally disabled victims do not fare well in our verbally based adversarial processes that 
demands [sic] mental agility, a good memory, quick responses, and a facility to readily 
employ a rich vocabulary to accurately describe or slyly obfuscate truth.1 
WOMEN WHO ARE VICTIMS of sexual assault must overcome a number of serious 
hurdles before a charge of sexual assault is approved. Th ey must deal with the 
physical and emotional trauma of the assault; they must be interviewed by police, 
sometimes multiple times; and they are often subject to an intrusive physical 
1. R v Gadway (1993), 21 WCB (2d) 383, YJ No 69 at para 42 (Terr Ct) (QL).
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examination. Police and prosecutors decide whether their story is unfounded2 
and whether there is a likelihood of conviction suffi  cient to warrant proceeding 
with the charge.3
For women with mental disabilities these challenges are magnifi ed.4 While 
recognizing that this is not a homogenous group of women, we can say that 
women with mental disabilities may require various kinds of assistance to have 
full access to police services and services off ered to victims of sexual assault. Th ey 
may have diffi  culties remembering and communicating what has happened to 
them.5 Th e person who assaulted them is often a caregiver or other person in a 
position of trust.6 In a more limited number of cases, they may not understand 
2. Sexual assault complaints continue to be declared unfounded at a higher rate than other 
charges, despite an absence of evidence that they are, in fact, more likely to be fabricated. See 
Holly Johnson, “Limits of a criminal justice response: Trends in police and court processing 
of sexual assault” in Elizabeth Sheehy, ed, Sexual Assault Law Practice and Activism in a 
Post-Jane Doe Era (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2012); UK, Home Offi  ce Research, 
A gap or a chasm? Attrition in reported rape cases (Research Study 293) by Liz Kelly, Jo Lovett 
& Linda Regan (London: Home Offi  ce, 2005); Australia, Victoria, Statewide Steering 
Committee to Reduce Sexual Assault, Study of Reported Rapes in Victoria 2000-2003 
(Summary Research Report) by Melanie Heenan & Suellen Murray (Melbourne: Offi  ce of 
Women’s Policy, July 2006).
3. Th e policies and standards on this charge screening vary from province to province. In 
Ontario, prosecutors must proceed if there is a reasonable prospect of conviction. In British 
Columbia, the standard is higher: a reasonable likelihood of conviction and whether a 
prosecution is required in the public interest. Minister of Attorney General, Province of 
Ontario, “Charge Screening” in Crown Policy Manual, 21 March 2005, online: <http://
www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/crim/cpm/2005/ChargeScreening.pdf>; Criminal 
Justice Branch, Ministry of Attorney General, Province of British Columbia, “Charge 
Assessment Guidelines” in Crown Counsel Policy Manual, 2 October 2009, online: <http://
www.ag.gov.bc.ca/prosecution-service/policy-man/pdf/CHA1-ChargeAssessmentGuidelines-
2Oct2009.pdf>.
4. As in our past work in this area, we use the term “mental disability” to refer collectively to 
intellectual, developmental, and psychiatric disabilities that result in cognitive impairment 
aff ecting comprehension, communication, or learning. Such disabilities may be present from 
birth or acquired through illness or accident. We recognize that this is an extremely diverse 
group of women and that the term “mental disability” is not used by any of these groups as 
a descriptor. We use it as a collective reference because it is the term used in section 15(1) of 
the Charter, which guarantees equality without discrimination on the basis of sex and mental 
or physical disability among its listed grounds. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 
I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, 
s 15(1) [Charter].
5. R v Harper, 2002 YKSC 18, YJ no 38 [Harper]; R v Parrott, 2001 SCC 3, [2001] 1 SCR 
178 (QL).
6. See Dick Sobsey, Violence and Abuse in the Lives of People With Disabilities: Th e End of 
Silent Acceptance? (Baltimore: Paul H Brookes, 1994) at 75-79.
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that what has been done to them is a criminal off ence, or they may not understand 
the nature and consequences of sexual activity.7
If a woman with a mental disability can navigate the system to the point at 
which charges are laid, her challenges continue. Women with mental disabilities 
are subjected to sexual assault at a considerably higher rate than other women.8 
One would expect, therefore, that the criminal-justice system would have developed 
means to ensure that this group of complainants could have their stories heard 
and acknowledged in court. In fact, these are among the hardest sexual assaults 
to prosecute, and the system itself erects barriers to women with mental disabilities 
accessing the criminal justice system. Complainants are expected to have fully 
functioning memories, to be able to answer detailed questions about minute 
7. See R v McPherson (1999), WL 556 (BCSC). For further discussion, see Michelle McCarthy, 
Sexuality and Women with Learning Disabilities (London: Jessica Kingsley, 1999) at 120-201.
8. It is diffi  cult to fi nd current empirical studies on the incidence of sexual assault against 
women with mental disabilities as many rely on the 1990s work cited here. See e.g. Erin 
Barger et al, “Sexual Assault Prevention for Women With Intellectual Disabilities: A Critical 
Review of the Evidence” (2009) 47:4 Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities 249. Th e 
leading studies from the 1990s include Roeher Institute, No More Victims: A Manual to Guide 
Counselors and Social Workers In Addressing the Sexual Abuse of People with a Mental Handicap 
(North York: Roeher Institute, 1992) at 25; Roeher Institute, Harm’s Way: Th e Many Faces 
of Violence and Abuse Against Persons with Disabilities (North York: Roeher Institute, 1995) 
at 9; Sobsey, supra note 6 at 69; McCarthy, supra note 7 at 29-30. However, more recent 
work shows that the incidence of sexual assault against women with mental disabilities 
is signifi cantly higher than the incidence against women without this label. See Sandra L 
Martin et al, “Physical and Sexual Assault of Women with Disabilities” (2006) 12:9 Violence 
Against Women 823 at 829. In their North Carolina study, Martin et al found that the 
incidence of sexual assault against women with cognitive disabilities was approximately three 
times that of women without disabilities. Some studies do not distinguish between mental 
and physical disability. For example, in a Canadian study, persons with disabilities were 
generally found to be three times more likely to be subjected to sexual violence at the hands 
of their intimate partners. See Douglas A Brownridge “Partner Violence Against Women 
With Disabilities: Prevalence, Risk, and Explanations” (2006) 12:9 Violence Against Women 
805. Brownridge also found that the diff erence in rates of violence between women with 
disabilities and those without has increased since the late 1990s (ibid at 812). Th e General 
Social Survey on victimization conducted by Statistics Canada excludes respondents living 
in institutions, thereby excluding some people with mental disabilities. It also combines 
mental and physical disabilities. Th e most recent report from the Canadian Centre for Justice 
Statistics also fi nds, based on this data, that persons with disabilities report sexual assault at 
a rate of more than twice that of respondents without disabilities. See Canada, Canadian 
Centre for Justice Statistics, Criminal Victimization and Health: A Profi le of Victimization 
Among Persons with Activity Limitations or Other Health Problems, (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 
2009) at 8. While the defi nition of persons with “activity limitations” included those with 
mental disabilities, the exclusion of persons in institutions suggests that this number is 
artifi cially low.                       
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details of the off ence (often phrased in complex language), and, perhaps most 
importantly, to be able to stand up to a robust cross-examination, which may 
include leading questions, allegations of falsifi cation, and repeated questioning 
likely to confuse any witness.
We have argued elsewhere that the criminal justice system in Canada was 
not designed with the needs and interests of this group of witnesses in mind.9 
We have contended that, given the high rate of sexual assault faced by women 
with mental disabilities, they should be considered paradigmatic rather than 
exceptional victims. In this article we build on these premises by considering 
existing discriminatory barriers that prevent the evidence of these women from 
being fully heard in court. In particular, we consider the challenges posed by 
traditional methods of cross-examination for witnesses with cognitive, developmental, 
or intellectual disabilities that aff ect their ability to recall, process, and communicate 
information. We describe the kinds of accommodations currently available for 
these witnesses and examine whether they ought to be expanded or modifi ed to 
better respond to these concerns.10 We also examine some of the subtler and more 
pervasive barriers to complainants with mental disabilities, focusing on the process 
of examining a witness and, particularly, subjecting her to cross-examination. 
One of our goals is to reconsider whether cross-examination, thought to be at 
the heart of the adversarial system, can be conducted in a way that respects both 
the right of the accused to a fair trial and the complainant’s right to sex equality.
 In this article, we argue that current practices distort rather than facilitate 
the truth-seeking function of a trial for this group of witnesses. Subjecting a 
woman with a mental disability to a rigorous cross-examination with repeated 
and leading questions, in a manner that is confrontational and often accusatory, 
is probably the worst way to get her story heard in court. It is likely to unfairly 
undermine her credibility and to result in unjustifi ed acquittals, or to result in 
prosecutors deciding not to pursue a case knowing that the complainant could 
not withstand these practices. Even direct examination can fail to fairly bring out 
9. Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant, “Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with 
Mental Disabilities: Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief ” (2007) 52:2 McGill LJ 243 
[Benedet & Grant, “Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief ”].
10. Th ere is also the very real possibility that a witness with mental disabilities will not be 
permitted to testify at all, because he or she is considered to be incapable of testifying, 
whether under oath or on a promise to tell the truth. We consider this question briefl y 
below in Part I, and in more detail in a forthcoming article, “More Th an An Empty Gesture: 
Enabling Women with Mental Disabilities to Testify On a Promise to Tell the Truth” (2013) 
CJWL [Benedet & Grant, “More Th an an Empty Gesture”].
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the complainant’s story if the questioning is not conducted with the necessary 
attention to the complainant’s particular abilities. 
Th e Criminal Code (the Code)11 provides some accommodations that are 
designed to make the process less traumatic for a complainant with a mental 
disability rather than to facilitate the actual questioning process itself. Few 
accommodations go to the heart of what makes these cases so diffi  cult to prosecute, 
namely our legal system’s assumptions about the truth-seeking function of a trial 
and how it is best accomplished. We examine these existing accommodations 
and conclude that, while they are important, they do not speak to the problems 
we have identifi ed. We suggest that victim-support persons, sometimes called 
intermediaries, be used as a matter of course, and that they be allowed to assist 
the witness in understanding the questions posed and in communicating her 
answers. Th is would be an important step towards meaningful support for this 
group of witnesses. We also suggest that judges be given explicit legislative 
authority to intervene to disallow questions that are inappropriate based on the 
particular witness’s abilities. However, we will also argue that the attitudes about 
the credibility and the sexuality of women with mental disabilities must also be 
changed in order to truly allow this group of witnesses to have their stories heard 
fully in court.
A Note on Gender
While our work focuses on women, who make up the large majority of sexual-assault 
victims, many of our concerns about the criminal trial apply in similar fashion to 
men with mental disabilities who complain of sexual assault and who are called as 
witnesses by the Crown.12 We have not excluded these cases and, where we speak 
generally of “witnesses” with mental disabilities, our analysis applies to both male 
and female victims. We focus on women with mental disabilities because 
there are particular gendered assumptions about sexual assault that intersect 
with the general systemic defi ciencies in cases involving complainants with 
mental disabilities.13 
11. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 [Code].
12. Indeed, one can infer that accused persons who have mental disabilities and who decide to 
take the stand in their own defence may experience some of the same challenges. Th is subject 
is beyond the scope of this article but deserves further attention. Th is article suggests that 
enhancing support for all witnesses with mental disabilities may benefi t the criminal trial 
process as a whole.
13. A recent report by Statistics Canada indicates that 97 per cent of accused persons in 
sexual assault crimes are male, while rates of sexual victimization range from 4 to 5.6 
times greater for females than for males. Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 
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Th e myths and stereotypes that have been applied to women’s complaints of 
sexual assault are well-documented in case law and scholarship.14 Th ese attitudes 
have led some to blame women for their own victimization,15 to distinguish victims 
according to their perceived chastity (measured along racial lines, among other 
factors),16 and to construct scripts for how a ‘real’ rape victim would behave 
that may bear little relation to actual victim behaviour.17 ‘Real’ rape has been 
understood to involve a stranger who uses overwhelming force to subdue his 
struggling victim. Sexual assaults between acquaintances or intimates that involve 
the consumption of alcohol or drugs or that involve delayed disclosure risk 
being considered unfounded or less serious.18 Underlying these myths is the 
Sexual Assault in Canada 2004 and 2007 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2008) at 11-12. See 
also Statistics Canada, “Th e nature of sexual off ences,” online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/
pub/85f0033m/2008019/fi ndings-resultats/nature-eng.htm>. Th us in this paper, when 
discussing sexual assault specifi cally, we utilize language that refl ects the gendered reality of 
sexual assault, referring to the accused as “he” and the complainant as “she.”
14. R v Seaboyer, [1991] 2 SCR 577, 83 DLR (4th) 193 [Seaboyer]; Elizabeth A Sheehy, 
“Causation, Common Sense, and the Common Law: Replacing Unexamined Assumptions 
with What We Know About Male Violence Against Women or from Jane Doe to Bonnie 
Mooney” (2006) 17:1 CJWL 87; Elizabeth Sheehy, “From Women’s Duty to Resist to Men’s 
Duty to Ask: How Far Have We Come?” (2000) 20:3 Can Woman Stud 98.
15. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé makes this point generally about sexual assault against girls and 
young women in R v L(DO), [1993] 4 SCR 419 at para 29, 88 Man R (2d) 241 [L(DO)].
16. William H George & Lorraine J Martinez, “Victim Blaming in Rape: Eff ects of Victim and 
Perpetrator Race, Type of Rape, and Participant Racism” (2002) 26:2 Psychol Of Women 
Q 110; Roxanne A Donovan, “To Blame or Not To Blame: Infl uences of Target Race and 
Observer Sex on Rape Blame Attribution” (2007) 22:6 J Interpers Violence 722; Regina A 
Schuller & Marc A Klippenstine, “Th e Impact of Complainant Sexual History Evidence on 
Jurors’ Decisions: Considerations From a Psychological Perspective” (2004) 10:3 Psychol, 
Pub Pol’y & L 321.
17. See e.g. R v JAA, 2011 SCC 17, [2011] 1 SCR 628; R v Butts, 2012 ONCA 24 at para 
24, 91 CR (6th) 424 (fi nding relevant evidence that complainant had consensual sex with 
someone two hours after the alleged sexual assault). See also Lise Gotell, “Rethinking 
Affi  rmative Consent in Canadian Sexual Assault Law: Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky 
Women” (2008) 41:4 Akron LR 865.
18. For example, in February 2011, a Manitoba judge on the Court of Queen’s Bench handed 
down an unusually lenient sentence for a conviction of sexual assault, noting that the 
female victim was wearing a tube top with no bra and lots of makeup and saying she sent 
signals that “sex was in the air.” R v Rhodes, 2011 MBCA 98, 98 WCB (2d) 329. See media 
coverage in, for instance, Mike McIntyre, “‘No woman asks to be raped’: Victim slams 
judge’s decision,” National Post (25 February 2011), online: <http://news.nationalpost.
com/2011/02/25/no-woman-asks-to-be-raped-victim-slams-judges-decision/>. For evidence 
of this tendency in the context of marital sexual assault, see Ruthy Lazar “Negotiating Sex: 
Th e Legal Construction of Consent in Cases of Wife Rape in Ontario, Canada” (2010) 
22:2 CJWL 329. For evidence of similar reasoning in applications for exemption from sex 
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persistent belief that women falsify complaints of sexual assault out of spite, 
fantasy, or shame.19
While many of these myths have been recognized as such by courts and 
commentators,20 this does not mean that their infl uence over collective consciousness 
has been erased in the span of a few decades.21 In particular, merely being told that 
these are stereotypes may do little to dislodge these myths if they are not replaced 
by credible contrary information about victim behaviour and the prevalence of 
sexual assaults in various settings.
Women with mental disabilities are aff ected by these myths and stereotypes 
in ways that are sex-specifi c. We have written elsewhere that the history of public 
policy responses to what was usually called “mental retardation” has been one 
in which women with mental disabilities have simultaneously been treated as 
asexual, in that they have been denied sexual health information and discouraged 
from sexual activity, and as hypersexual, in that they are understood as moti-
vated by animal instincts and eager for indiscriminate sexual contact.22 Th e myth of 
hypersexuality is particularly potent in the sexual assault context, as it can be used 
to portray the victim as the true sexual aggressor.23 More subtly, there can be a belief 
that women with mental disabilities are ‘lucky’ when a man displays sexual interest 
in them and that they ought to be grateful for that attention.24 Th is conclusion 
off ender registration, see Janine Benedet, “A Victim-Centred Evaluation of the Federal Sex 
Off ender Registry” (2012) 37:2 Queen’s LJ 437.
19. See, for instance, Dickson J’s (as he then was) comments in R v Pappajohn, [1980] 2 SCR 
120 at 149, 111 DLR (3d) 1. Also see Philip NS Rumney, “False Allegations of Rape” (2006) 
65:1 Cambridge LJ 125 (noting infl uence of false allegation claims on evidentiary rules and 
unreliability of measurements of false allegations).
20. See Heureux-Dubé J’s comments in Seaboyer, supra note 14 at 649-56, 659-61.
21. Eliana Suarez & Tahany M Gadalla, “Stop Blaming the Victim: A Meta-Analysis on Rape 
Myths” (2010) 25:11 J Interpers Violence 2010 (considering demographic factors associated 
with rape myth acceptance); Melanie Randall, “Sexual Assault Law, Credibility, and ‘Ideal 
Victims’: Consent, Resistance, and Victim Blaming” (2010) 22:2 CJWL 397.
22. Benedet & Grant, “Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief,” supra note 9.
23. For example, in R v Alsadi the trial judge acquitted the accused on the basis that a civilly 
committed woman with a mental disability had initiated the sexual activity with the accused, 
a uniformed security guard in the hospital. Th e British Columbia Court of Appeal ordered 
a new trial on the basis of errors made by the trial judge with respect to whether the accused 
abused a position of trust or authority. 2012 BCCA 183, [2012] BCJ No 826 (QL) [Alsadi].
24. Personal conversation with Delphine Raymond, Collectif Feministe Contre Le Viol, 
31 October 2011. See also Sherene Razack, “From Consent to Responsibility, from 
Pity to Respect: Subtexts in Cases of Sexual Violence Involving Girls and Women with 
Developmental Disabilities” (1994) 19:4 Law & Soc Inquiry 891; Carol A Howland & 
Diana H Rintala, “Dating Behaviors of Women with Physical Disabilities” (2001) 19:1 
Sexuality and Disability 41.
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may be even stronger where the woman has other characteristics that make her 
less ‘attractive’ in conventional terms, such as obesity or physical disabilities.25
Other gendered assumptions apply with respect to male victims, who are 
also typically targeted by male abusers.26 In particular, we recognize that sexu-
al assaults against male victims are also acts of gendered violence that raise 
diff erent stereotypes aff ecting the assessment of the witness on the stand. Most 
sexual assaults against men are committed by other men in a social context of 
homophobia where it is not automatically assumed that the complainant must 
have consented to the same-sex sexual activity. While this may sometimes work 
to the benefi t of the male complainant’s credibility, the assumption that a 
non-consenting victim will show vigorous physical resistance may be stronger for 
male victims than for women.27
People of both sexes with mental disabilities also face other stereotypes 
aff ecting credibility. It is often assumed that they cannot distinguish fact from 
fi ction,28 that they are more likely to make up stories around sexual assault, 29 or 
that they are more likely to lie because they do not appreciate the solemnity and 
consequences of judicial proceedings.30 Th ese assumptions take on a gendered 
dimension because of historical attitudes that treated women as less credible 
than men, and sexually active women as further diminished in credibility.31 
25. Sarah M Buel, “Fifty Obstacles to Leaving, a.k.a., Why Abuse Victims Stay” (1999) 28:10 
Colorado Lawyer 19 at 21-22.
26. Michael Scarce, Male on Male Rape: Th e Hidden Toll Of Stigma and Shame (New York: 
Insight Books, 1997); Philip NS Rumney & Natalia Hanley, “Th e mythology of male 
rape: Social attitudes and law enforcement,” in Clare McGlynn & Vanessa E Munro, eds, 
Rethinking Rape Law: National, International and Comparative Perspectives (New York: 
Routledge, 2010) 294; Catherine A MacKinnon, Oncale v Sundowner Off shore Services, Inc., 
96–568, Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Petitioner (1997) 8:1 UCLA Women’s LJ 9.
27. See e.g. R v RJS (1994), 123 Nfl d & PEIR 317, 25 WCB (2d) 275 (PEISC).
28. See, for example, the reference to confusing truth with “wishful thinking” by the dissent of 
Justice Binnie in R v DAI, 2012 SCC 5 at para 145, 280 CCC (3d) 127 [DAI], rev’g 2010 
ONCA 133, 73 CR (6th) 50. 
29. R v Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24, [2008] 1 SCR 788, rev’g 2007 QCCA 287, 75 WCB (2d) 
657 [Dinardo].
30. R v Farley (1995), 23 OR (3d) 445 (CA), 40 CR (4th) 190 [Farley]; R v Lanthier, 36 WCB 
(2d) 189, [1997] OJ No 4238 (Ct J).
31. Kathy Mack, “Continuing Barriers to Women’s Credibility: A Feminist Perspective on 
the Proof Process” (1993) 4:2 Crim LF 327; Rosemary C Hunter, “Gender in Evidence: 
Masculine Norms vs. Feminist Reforms” (1996) 19 Harv Women’s LJ 127; Ann Althouse, 
“Th e Lying Woman, the Devious Prostitute, and Other Stories from the Evidence Casebook” 
(1994) 88:3 Nw UL Rev 914; Christine Boyle, “Reasonable doubt in credibility contests: 
sexual assault and sexual equality” (2009) 13:4 Int’l J Evidence and Proof 269 at 284-91.
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Th us women with mental disabilities who complain of sexual assault face an 
especially diffi  cult challenge.
I. CROSS-EXAMINATION AS A SYSTEMIC BARRIER 
What is it that makes sexual assault cases involving witnesses with mental disabilities 
particularly hard to prosecute successfully? We contend, in particular, that the experi-
ence of cross-examination as presently permitted deters valid complaints from being 
made, causes prosecutors not to proceed with cases that are otherwise sound, and 
results in unjustifi ed acquittals. None of the accommodations presently available 
to complainants is meant to be responsive to these problems.
A common law criminal trial seeks to uncover the truth about a series of 
events within the complex structures that the legal system has developed to ensure 
a fair trial. In the context of sexual assault prosecutions where the complainant 
has a mental disability, we argue that the importance of truth seeking can be 
obscured by our unquestioning adherence to rules that may in fact hinder rather 
than facilitate the pursuit of truth. We are not suggesting that aggressive cross-
examination of sexual assault complainants is only a problem for complainants with 
mental disabilities, but rather that the problem is particularly acute for women 
who have cognitive limitations that are easy for defence counsel to exploit.
Th ere is no doubt that cross-examination is seen as a fundamental part of our 
common law adversarial system. Historically speaking, the right to cross-examine, 
along with many other facets of common law criminal justice systems, developed 
in pursuit of a fair trial process that would make meaningful the presumption 
of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Karen 
Muller and Mark Tait32 summarize the traditionally accepted purposes of 
cross-examination as follows:
Th e purposes of cross-examination are twofold: Firstly, to elicit information that is 
favourable to the party conducting the cross-examination. Secondly, to cast doubt 
upon the accuracy of the evidence given in chief by the witness. Th is would mean 
that in the course of cross-examination only questions concerning facts relevant to 
the issue or to the witness’s credibility may be asked.33
Th ere is a fundamental belief that cross-examination, and the techniques employed 
in it, are tools for discovering the truth and assessing credibility. According to Wigmore, 
32. David Carson, “Regulating the Cross-Examination of Children” (delivered at the BS&L 
Network Conference, 2 April 1995) at 4, cited in Karen Muller & Mark Tait, “Th e Child 
Witness and the Accused’s Right to Cross-Examination” (1997) J South African L 519 at 520.
33. Muller & Tait, ibid at 519.
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it is “Th e greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the truth” and leaves 
not a moment’s doubt in the mind of any lawyer as to its eff ectiveness … .34
Yet the idea that cross-examination as currently understood is fundamental 
to a fair trial is often accepted as true without adequate scrutiny. In particular, 
endorsements of the power of cross-examination rarely distinguish between 
contradictions that reveal the truth and those that obscure it. A witness may make 
a mistake or get confused on cross-examination, but this does not necessarily mean 
she is lying.35 As David Carson explains, this witness may simply “be very poor at 
being a witness rather than … a truth-teller.”36 Th e court is not actually assisted 
in its truth-fi nding role when lawyers rely upon questioning techniques that 
demonstrate only that a particular witness is fallible under cross-examination.
Muller and Tait further argue that cross-examination can impede the truth-
seeking function:
Cross-examination is often regarded as a feature of an adversarial system which 
enables it to claim superiority over the inquisitorial system. However, adherents of 
the latter system have often accused the adversarial system of giving an “exaggerated 
effi  ciency” to the right of questioning. Th ey argue that cross-examination bends and 
distorts the evidence by means of suggestive questions and that justice cannot prevail 
in an atmosphere where witnesses are infl uenced and badgered.37
Th ere is a parallel here with the problem of false confessions by accused 
persons that are at the heart of many of our wrongful convictions. It was once 
widely assumed that no suspect would falsely implicate him or herself in a 
serious crime. Yet we now know that police tactics like pretending to have found 
damning evidence of guilt, or repeatedly questioning the suspect for many hours 
without respite, may produce exactly such a confession—one that impedes rather 
than assists in getting at the ‘truth.’ Th is may be particularly true where the goal 
of the interrogation is to get a confession rather than to gather useful evidence. 
In a similar fashion, it is quite possible that witnesses will falsely contradict 
themselves out of confusion, fatigue, or fear under cross-examination, and this 
possibility is heightened where the witness has a cognitive or intellectual disability.
In this article, we do not consider cases in which there is a challenge by 
the defence to the competence of the complainant to give evidence in court.38 
34. Ibid at 520.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. François Gorphe, La Critique du Témoinage (Paris: Dalloz, 1927) at 90, cited in ibid at 521.
38. We consider this problem in detail in a forthcoming article. “More Th an An Empty Gesture,” 
supra note 10.
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We note, however, that this remains a possibility in sexual assault cases involving 
complainants with mental disabilities. Until recently, the questioning on the voir 
dire could itself be problematic for complainants, who were faced with abstract 
questions about the meaning of “truth” and “promises” or inquiries into their 
religious education.39 Th e Supreme Court of Canada has recently addressed this 
issue in R v DAI,40 where a majority held that a competency inquiry should 
determine only whether the witness can communicate the evidence and whether 
she can make a promise to tell the truth. It is thus no longer acceptable to ask 
the witness questions about her ability to understand the promise or about her 
understanding of the meaning of truth and lies. However, the precise contours 
of what questions will be acceptable will need further clarifi cation after DAI.41
In the following Part of this article we demonstrate that our traditional 
methods of cross-examination may be contrary to the truth-seeking function of 
the criminal trial, particularly for witnesses with mental disabilities. We begin 
by summarizing the social science evidence on the subject, which suggests that 
cross-examination serves to obfuscate rather than elucidate the truth for many 
witnesses with mental disabilities. We then move on to illustrate some of these 
problems by examining sexual assault prosecutions involving complainants with 
mental disabilities. 
II. SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE ON CROSS-EXAMINATION 
OF WITNESSES WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES
Th e available social science literature supports the view that witnesses with mental 
disabilities are able to give accurate, useful, and truthful evidence that furthers 
the truth-seeking process, but that their ability to do so is greatly hindered by 
current practices of cross-examination. Of course, this is a very heterogeneous 
group of complainants, and it would be wrong to assume that every complainant, 
regardless of her disability, has precisely the same diffi  culties or needs precisely 
the same accommodation.42 It is also important to note that the various social 
39. Th is was done at the competency hearing held in DAI. Supra note 28 at para 84.
40. Ibid.
41. For example, we argue that it is not acceptable after DAI to ask a witness: “If I said my 
sweater is red (when it is in fact blue) would I be lying?” Rather, we will suggest in a 
forthcoming article that the proper question is: “Is my sweater red?” Th e latter question 
suffi  ciently tests the complainant’s ability to communicate facts and her ability to disagree 
with the questioner about the colour of the sweater. See Benedet & Grant, “More Th an an 
Empty Gesture,” supra note 10.
42. Louise Ellison, “Th e mosaic art?: cross-examination and the vulnerable witness” (2001) 21:3 
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science studies involve diff erent populations and use diff erent language to describe 
the group studied; thus it is diffi  cult to generalize from any one study to persons 
with mental disabilities across the board.43 However, some fi ndings are consistent 
enough that it is possible to draw some generalizations from the literature that 
allow us to challenge some of our existing practices. 
We know that some witnesses with mental disabilities may have “broad 
defi cits in memory encoding, storage and retrieval.”44 Some witnesses will only 
have trouble with long-term memory, while others will have diffi  culty even with 
short-term memory.45 We also know that most witnesses with intellectual disabilities 
do best with questions that are open ended rather than closed.46 For example, a 
witness with an intellectual disability might respond better to a question like 
“tell us what happened on the day of the picnic” than to a question like “what 
colour was the accused’s shirt on the day of the picnic?” In fact, when given open-
ended questions, witnesses with intellectual disabilities have a high accuracy rate, 
although they may not give as much information as witnesses without disabilities.47 
Mark R. Kebbell et al described the reasons witnesses with intellectual disabilities 
typically do better with open-ended questions:
Th e infl uence of question type can be understood in terms of the diff erent cognitive 
and social demands of diff erent question formats. For more open questions, the 
task is to tell the interviewer what the witness can remember relying on their own 
memory. For more specifi c, closed questions, the task changes to one of providing 
the interviewer with what he or she wants the witness to remember that the witness 
may not be able to recall. As witnesses with intellectual disabilities spontaneously recall 
fewer details concerning events, it is unsurprising that they provide less accurate 
answers to specifi c questions and tend to confabulate.48
Leading questions can be particularly problematic. Studies have shown that 
this occurs because persons with certain intellectual disabilities are more suggest-
ible and may try to please the questioner more than other witnesses. Th ere may also 
be a tendency for a witness with a mental disability to answer “yes” to a question 
LS 353 at 354-55.
43. Depending on when and where the study was conducted, some of that language is no longer 
considered appropriate to describe people with disabilities. For the purposes of accuracy, in 
describing the studies, we use the language of the authors in the studies.
44. Mark R Kebbell, Christopher Hatton & Shane D Johnson, “Witnesses with intellectual 
disabilities in court: What questions are asked and what infl uence do they have?” (2004) 9:1 
Legal & Criminological Psychology 23 at 23 [Kebbell, Hatton & Johnson].
45. Harper, supra note 5.
46. Kebbell, Hatton & Johnson, supra note 44.
47. Ibid at 24.
48. Ibid [citations omitted].
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when the question is not understood. Th is may be due to the witness’s cognitive 
ability, a desire to please the interviewer,49 or because persons with intellectual 
disabilities may be quite skilled at giving the impression that they understand a 
question by agreeing with the questioner.50 Some data suggest that when a question 
is repeated, a person with an intellectual disability will be more likely to change 
her answer on the basis that the questioner must have asked again because he or 
she did not like the fi rst answer.51 Persons with disabilities may also have learned 
that acquiescing makes sense if they believe that authority fi gures are more likely 
than they are to know the right answer.52 
Th e manipulation of language may lie at the heart of cross-examination. 
However, as Louise Ellison notes:
Language has been identifi ed as the ‘primary manipulative tool’ at the disposal of 
lawyers in court. In the context of cross-examination, it is a tool often abused to gain 
advantage over immature and comparably unsophisticated language users.53 
Th us witnesses whose disabilities interfere with their capacity to comprehend and 
manipulate language are at a stark disadvantage in the criminal justice process.
Th e use of complex language and questions may be particularly confusing on 
cross-examination, which often evolves “on the fl y” as the answers are received. 
Kebbell et al summarize their fi ndings on this topic:
... [C]hildren and adults from the general population were much less accurate when 
questions were asked using the kind of language favoured by lawyers (e.g. negatives, 
double-negatives, and multi-part questions) than when asked questions in everyday 
language. Negatives are questions that involve the word ‘not’ (e.g. ‘Did the man not 
tell you to be quiet?’). Double-negatives involve the word ‘not’ twice (e.g. ‘Did John 
not say that he would not go to the shops?’) Multi-part questions involve two or 
more parts that have diff erent answers (e.g. ‘At eleven o’ clock were you in the bar? 
Was John at the garage?’). Experimental evidence shows that children and adults 
frequently give ‘don’t know’ or incorrect responses to over-complex questions even 
though they know the answer to the question if it is phrased simply. In non-court 
situations, these factors appear to be particularly problematic for people with 
intellectual disabilities.54
49. Carol K Sigelman et al, “When in Doubt Say Yes: Acquiescence in Interviews with Mentally 
Retarded Persons” (1981) 19:2 Mental Retardation 53.
50. Kebbell, Hatton & Johnson, supra note 44 at 32.
51. Ellison, supra note 42 at 362.
52. Ibid at 359.
53. Ibid at 354-55 [citations omitted].
54.  Kebbell, Hatton & Johnson, supra note 44 at 25 [citations omitted]. Kebbell et al explain 
that “[c]onfabulation involves replacing gaps in memory with distorted or fabricated 
material. Suggestibility is providing the answer believed to be required by the questioner, 
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Nancy W. Perry et al also found that the closed questions typical of cross-
examination may decrease the accuracy of eyewitness testimony in general, and 
that this tendency was especially pronounced in the case of eyewitnesses with 
intellectual disabilities. Further, individuals with intellectual disabilities may be 
especially vulnerable to the heavily suggestive leading questions (for instance, “He 
went to the bathroom after he got a coff ee, yes?”) often used in cross-examination. 
Th e increased suggestibility of witnesses with intellectual disabilities can be 
unjustly used to argue that they are lying or have an unreliable memory when 
in fact it may mean that diff erent types of questions are better suited to trigger 
a memory and that some types of details (such as dates and times) are less likely 
to be remembered.55 When a witness hesitates or expresses confusion, this can be 
misinterpreted as a lack of honesty or credibility, even when the details that cannot 
be recalled are not important to the allegations at issue.
Cross-examination involves a high level of leading questions for all witnesses, 
not just those with mental disabilities.56 However, Kebbell et al found that witnesses 
with mental disabilities were more likely to be asked questions repeatedly, which 
the authors hypothesize may be due to an attempt to exploit suggestibility or 
merely because the witness did not appear to understand.57 A witness with a 
mental disability may also be less likely to provide additional information58 or ask 
for clarifi cation if they do not understand the question. 
Th e authors discuss the implications of these fi ndings for witnesses with 
intellectual disabilities:
Witnesses with intellectual disabilities were signifi cantly more likely than general 
population witnesses to agree with the force of a leading question, less likely to 
disagree with the force of the question, and less likely to provide additional 
information, particularly in cross-examination. Lawyers are likely to deliberately 
exploit the characteristics of leading questions. As Evans (1995) points out in his 
trial manual, leading questions are a powerful tool – both because they allow the 
lawyer to formulate events as he or she sees them, and because they constrain the witness 
to reply in a certain way. Th e implication of these results is that cross examination as 
which may involve simple compliance with the questioner’s demands or incorporation of 
the suggestion into recollection. Acquiescence concerns the fact that people are more likely 
to say ‘yes’ than ‘no’ to questions which require a yes or no response.” “People with learning 
disabilities as witnesses in court: What questions should lawyers ask?” (2001) 29:3 British 
Journal of Learning Disabilities 98 at 99 [citations omitted].
55. Nancy W Perry et al, “When Lawyers Question Children: Is Justice Served?” (1995) 19:6 
Law & Human Behavior 609, as cited in Kebbell, Hatton & Johnson supra note 44.
56. Ibid at 30.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid at 32.
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currently practised is particularly likely to lead to inaccurate testimony from wit-
nesses with intellectual disabilities.59
It may be that witnesses with mental disabilities are more suggestible only 
when they do not understand a particular question or know the answer to it. At 
least one study has found that they may be as steadfast as other witnesses when 
they are sure about their answers.60 Th e authors conclude that new approaches 
are needed to facilitate the process of questioning witnesses with disabilities, as is 
education for lawyers and judges on these issues.
Strategically-framed questions are not the only means by which defence lawyers 
assert control over a witness in cross-examination. Other commonly used tactics 
can also be intimidating to witnesses:
Vigorous objection, warnings, reminders, repetition of questions and the insis-
tence of proper answers are all devices used to attain and maintain editorial control. 
Th ese preventative techniques are not only ‘abrupt, frustrating and degrading to 
the witness’, but they also dramatically reduce scope for clarifi cation, explanation 
and elucidation. Th ere is, for example, no provision, as in everyday conversations, 
for a witness ‘to express their concerns, their possible lack of comprehension about 
the questions, or to negotiate in any way the content or direction of the line of 
questioning.’61
Given these diffi  culties with cross-examination in general and certain types 
of questions in particular, one might expect that judges would intervene to assist 
witnesses with mental disabilities by requiring lawyers to simplify their questions 
for such witnesses or at least to avoid very complex syntax, double negatives, and 
the like. In fact, one English study found otherwise. Th e authors had hypothesized 
that judicial intervention would be higher for witnesses with learning disabilities 
than for other witnesses.62 As the authors explain:
59. Ibid.
60. Mark Kebbell & Chris Hatton, “People With Mental Retardation as Witnesses in Court: A 
Review” (1999) 37:3 Mental Retardation 179.
61. Mark Brennan & Roslin E Brennan, Strange Language – child victims under cross examination 
(Wagga Wagga: Riverina Murray Institute of Higher Education, 1988), cited in Ellison, supra 
note 42 at 359-60.
62. Catriona ME O’Kelly et al, “Judicial intervention in court cases involving witnesses with 
and without learning disabilities” (2003) 8:2 Legal & Criminological Psychology 229. 
However, the authors concluded, there were “no signifi cant diff erences in the number of 
interventions made by the judge with witnesses depending on whether the witness had 
learning disabilities or was from the general population … .” Th is is perhaps surprising, 
given the generally poorer cognitive, memory, and linguistic skills of people with learning 
disabilities (ibid at 237).
BENEDET & GRANT, TAKING THE STAND 17
Potentially, the judge can have a tremendous impact on lawyers’ questioning styles 
and, consequently, witness accuracy. Th e function of controlling the trial is largely a 
matter of judicial discretion. In this respect, judges should act as impartial “umpires” 
and have the discretion to be fl exible enough to tailor their power to individual 
cases. Judges are obliged to have regard both to the need to ensure a fair trial for 
the defendant and to the reasonable interests of other parties to the court process, 
including witnesses.63
Contrary to expectations, the authors found no diff erence in the rate of 
intervention by judges for witnesses with intellectual disabilities as compared to 
other witnesses. Judges did not intervene any more often to assist witnesses with 
intellectual disabilities in making sure they understood the question or how they 
could reply; the same was true of interventions to call for breaks or to require 
lawyers to simplify their questions.64 Th e study also concluded that lawyers were 
not changing their type of questioning for witnesses with intellectual disabilities; 
rather they just continued their usual practices without any accommodation.65
We are not suggesting that cross-examination is always problematic nor that 
direct examination never is. An unprepared Crown counsel or one who has not 
made eff orts to understand the abilities of a particular complainant may also 
create confusion by using the wrong types of questions or overly complex linguistic 
devices. Similarly, in theory, defence counsel could be sensitive to the needs and 
abilities of the complainant, although this appears to be more challenging in 
practice given that cross-examination is more likely than examination-in-chief to 
involve leading, negative, and closed questioning and that defence counsel will 
have less familiarity with the complainant.66 Th e point is that all participants in 
the process—including Crown counsel, defence counsel, and judge—must be 
attuned to the needs and abilities of the witness. 
Th is social science evidence should at least give us pause about relying on the 
traditional methods of cross-examination for complainants with mental disabilities. 
If we really are trying to get at the truth, we should be asking questions that 
facilitate that objective rather than interfere with it. Th e right to cross-examination 
surely does not extend to the right to take advantage of vulnerable witnesses’ 
diffi  culties. Th e purpose of cross-examination should be to test and challenge the 
veracity of evidence, not to confuse and badger the witness into saying things that 
confl ict with what he or she may have said in direct examination. 
63. Ibid at 230 [citations omitted].
64. Ibid at 237.
65. Ibid at 230. See also Kebbell, Hatton & Johnson, supra note 44 at 30.
66. Ibid at 25, 32.
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III. THE CASE LAW—SOME EXAMPLES
Th e case law provides examples of sexual assault cases in which cross-examination 
and even direct examination appear to confuse the complainant and lead to 
doubts about her testimony that may not have been warranted. In this Part, 
we provide four examples of cases in which the complainant appeared confused 
about the questions being asked and where her credibility was undermined or 
challenged as a result. Th ese examples demonstrate that these questions can 
create diffi  culties through cross-examination, direct-examination, and even 
when appellate courts try to give meaning to apparent problems in a witness’s 
testimony. Our fourth example, drawn from New Zealand, demonstrates how 
clear intervention by a trial judge can mitigate the confusion caused to a witness 
by inappropriate questioning.
In R v DT,67 the 33-year-old complainant had numerous physical and mental 
disabilities that required her use of a wheelchair and left her with hearing, vision, and 
speech impairments. She testifi ed through American Sign Language interpreters 
and answered questions through “hand gestures, head nods, facial expressions 
and audible sounds.”68 Beginning when she was in her early twenties, there were 
a number of incidents of sexual activity with the accused, her “favorite uncle.”69 
Her evidence was that she had asked him to stop on several occasions and did not 
want the sexual activity to take place. Th e defence argued that the complainant 
consented. Th e trial judge expressed doubt that the complainant understood much 
of the sexual activity involved.70 He nonetheless found that non-consent had not 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt because “[s]ome of the complainant’s 
answers regarding whether she consented to the sexual activity on the date of 
the alleged off ence and any sexual activity that occurred prior to that date are 
ambiguous.”71 In direct examination, the complainant’s evidence could not have 
been labelled unclear; she indicated on several occasions that the accused hurt 
her, that the sexual activity made her “crazy,”72 that she wanted it to stop,73 and 
67. 2011 ONCJ 213, 85 CR (6th) 195 [DT].  
68. Ibid at para 1.
69. Ibid at para 47.
70. Notwithstanding this fi nding the trial judge made no inquiry into capacity to consent. See 
Benedet & Grant, “A Situational Approach to Incapacity and Mental Disability in Sexual 
Assault Law” (2012) 43:1 Ottawa L Rev [forthcoming].
71. DT, supra note 67 at para 41.
72. Ibid at para 3.
73. Ibid at para 6.
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that she “didn’t want it.”74 Nonetheless, during cross-examination she appears to 
have become confused following leading questions where answers were suggested 
to her and several questions were asked in the negative. Th e trial judge summarized 
the evidence, given through the interpreters, as follows:
She was questioned about the incident involving the accused putting his penis in 
her vagina. It was put to her that she asked him to touch her with his penis. She 
answered “not sure, I’m not sure”. It was put to her that when he was touching her 
boobs she said she didn’t want it anymore, counsel putting the emphasis on the 
word “anymore”. She answered she “wanted it to stop, but it kept going, kept going 
and I said stop, I don’t want”. It was put to her that in the past she allowed the 
accused to touch her sexually. Her response was “no, no, no, no”. When she was 
asked again about the arm wrestling incident she answered “he touched my breasts 
and vagina”. It was suggested by defence counsel that she didn’t say no that time. 
Answer: “Right”. She was questioned about the incidents at the camp. Counsel 
suggested that the accused would touch her. Answer: “yes that’s right, in the boat”. 
It was put to her that she never told anyone that was happening. Answer, “I didn’t 
that’s right”. It was suggested that she never told anyone she didn’t want to go back. 
She replied “No”.
Defence counsel asked about the accused coming over to her house. He suggested 
that she would let him in when he came back. She agreed. Th en counsel asked about 
August 8, 2009. Defence counsel suggested before he touched her breasts the accused 
asked her if he could. She answered “don’t remember, I’m confused”. Defence 
suggested the accused put his hand on her waist and then asked if he could touch 
her there. Answer: “Oh that’s right I’m sorry”. Defence went on to ask if he did 
touch her down there. She replied “yes”. Defence suggested the accused touched her 
because she said yes. Answer: “yes that’s right”.
She was asked about the bathroom incident. Defence asked her if the accused 
stimulated her in the bathroom. Answer: “yep”. It was suggested that there was lots 
of water. Answer: “Yeah right”. She was asked if that scared her. Answer: “yes, yes, 
right”. It was suggested she took her wet shorts and clothes and put them in hamper. 
She answered “yes”. Counsel suggested that they sat down and had pop together for 
15 minutes after that. Answer: “yeah”. It was suggested that she asked the accused 
what happened with the water in the bathroom. Answer: “don’t know”. Counsel 
then suggested the accused told her he had to leave and gave her a hug and left. 
Answer: “yes”.75
It is the ambiguity in this testimony that led the trial judge to have a reasonable 
doubt about non-consent. In our view, these paragraphs make it clear both that 
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid at paras 6-8.
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the complainant did not want sexual activity with the accused to take place and 
that she was having some diffi  culty with the questions asked on cross-examination. 
She acknowledged being confused, but it appears that no steps were taken to 
remedy that confusion and the questions kept coming. 
Th e Crown asked the court to look at “the totality of the evidence given 
by the complainant.”76 He argued that it was “clear from the entirety of the 
complainant’s evidence that she misunderstood the questions”77 surrounding the 
incident involving the touching with the accused’s penis. Intervention by the trial 
judge in assisting her to understand what was being asked could well have clarifi ed 
this ambiguity. Recognition that she was, by her own admission, becoming 
confused on cross-examination should have triggered some assistance for this 
witness.78 Instead, she was left to “sink or swim” in the hands of defence counsel. 
Th e only acknowledgement of this problem is the Crown’s submission after the 
fact that any ambiguities ought to be given less weight because of her disabilities. 
Th is is an unacceptable response to an obvious problem with the criminal trial 
process. As we will discuss below, this would have been an ideal case for someone 
who could have assisted the complainant in understanding the questions being 
asked and ensuring her responses were understood.
Dinardo79 is another example of a case in which the complainant was 
clearly confused by questioning. Th is case demonstrates how an appellate court 
decontextualized and, in our view, unnecessarily problematized testimony by a 
complainant with a mental disability. In Dinardo the complainant was a 22-year-
old woman with a mild mental disability and Tourette’s syndrome. Th e accused 
was a cab driver who was driving the complainant to an activity centre. On 
her arrival there she immediately recounted to the staff  that the cab driver had 
touched her breasts and put his fi nger inside her vagina.80 
On the voir dire to determine whether the complainant was competent to 
testify, she said that she understood what it meant to tell the truth, that she knew 
what lying meant, and that it was wrong. However, on cross-examination she was 
asked whether she ever invented stories. She testifi ed that she did sometimes 
76. Ibid at para 25.
77. Ibid at para 25.
78. Th e trial judge went on to fi nd that the accused had abused a position of trust or authority 
and therefore that there was no valid consent, a fi nding we applaud. However we are deeply 
troubled that the trial judge initially was not able to make a fi nding of non-consent on the 
evidence before him. Th e decision is currently under appeal. Ibid at para 48.
79. Dinardo, supra note 29.
80. Ibid at para 3.
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invent stories “to be funny”81—as an example she said that she sometimes said 
silly things such as that a friend “kicked … [her] in the ass.”82 Th e defence 
position was that she could be made to say almost anything. Th e following 
passage is taken from cross-examination by defence counsel followed by redirect 
examination by the Crown.
Q Th is story you told Ms. Th ériault on arriving at the Maison des Jeunes, is 
it possible that it, that the story was made up?
A Yes.
Q Why did you make the story up?
A Well, I made it up to say he touched me.
Q You made it up to say he touched you?
A Yes.
Q Why? You didn’t like him?
A No, I didn’t like him.
Q Why?
A I was afraid of him.
Q You were afraid of him. Because he had tattoos?
A Yes.
10 In re-examination, the complainant testifi ed as follows (A.R., at pp. 181-82):
[TRANSLATION]
Q [L]isten to me carefully. He said: “Is it possible that you made up the 
story you told Nicole Th ériault?
A Oh, I didn’t make it up.
Q Okay. But you said yes. Do you know … what do you mean by that? 
What is … explain that, about that.
A I didn’t make it up.
Q Okay. Your sentence, it was: “I made it up—after what he said to 
you—to say he touched me”.
A Yes.
Q What do you mean by that?
A He touched me.
Q Okay. But when you told her that, told Nicole Th ériault that, was it made 
up? Had you made it up?
A No.
11 At the end of the complainant’s testimony, the trial judge asked the following 
questions: (A.R., at p. 182):
[TRANSLATION]
BY THE COURT
81. Ibid at para 7.
82. Ibid.
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Q I have one, X. Can you tell me what it means to “make something up”?
A I don’t know.
Q You don’t know, eh? So when you answered earlier that, that you made it 
up, you don’t know what that means?
A No.83
Th e trial judge believed the complainant’s allegations and convicted the 
accused. Th e Court ordered a new trial on the basis that the trial judge had given 
inadequate reasons for disbelieving the accused. 
It was clear that the Court was troubled by the complainant’s “contradictory 
answers”84 and made no attempt to put them in the context of her disability. Her 
statement that she sometimes made up stories was translated by the Court into 
her admitting that she “had a tendency to lie.”85 She admitted that she made up 
stories to be funny, but this acknowledgement was blown out of proportion and 
distorted. In fact, her example of making a joking allegation about a friend shows 
a great degree of candour on the part of this witness and might cause one to have 
more confi dence in her evidence than a bold claim that she had never lied. 
In cross-examination, the complainant appeared to say that she made up the 
allegations but she quickly corrected herself on redirect and clarifi cation by the 
trial judge. One could not read this testimony and be left with any reasonable 
doubt that she ever admitted to fabricating the allegations. Th e trial judge zeroed 
in on the reason for the apparent contradiction, which was that the witness was 
not clear on what “making up” meant.86 She remained steadfast in her claim and 
the trial judge believed her. 
Our third example demonstrates how judges sometimes make assumptions 
about a witness’s level of functioning and what that should mean about her 
testimony. Inconsistencies in testimony may be portrayed as evidence of consent 
rather than as diffi  culties with the examination of the witness. Further, this case 
illustrates how inappropriate questioning by the Crown can also create diffi  culties 
for a complainant with a mental disability. 
In R v Prince,87 the complainant lived in the same apartment building as the 
accused. Th e accused and the complainant had met casually in the hall and, on 
two occasions, he entered her apartment under an excuse and initiated sexual 
activity with her. On the fi rst occasion, he sat with her on the couch, kissed her, 
83. Ibid at paras 9-11.
84. Ibid at para 9.
85. Ibid at para 17.
86. Th e trial was conducted in French, and the actual word at issue was inventer. Ibid at para 72.
87. 2008 MBQB 241, 232 Man R (2d) 281 [Prince].
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and touched her breasts. On the second occasion, the subject of the charge, he 
began by kissing her on the couch and ultimately led her to the bedroom where 
sexual intercourse took place.88 Th e trial judge accepted the defence’s argument 
that the complainant had consented because she had not said no and did not tell 
the accused to stop, although there was evidence that he had told the police that 
she probably had said no at some point, but that he could not remember. He had 
also admitted to police that he may have been using her. Th e accused did know 
that the complainant had a mental disability and had not asked her if she wanted 
the sexual activity to take place.89 
An expert witness testifi ed that the complainant was likely to give the answers 
she thought the questioner wanted to hear. Th e complainant contradicted herself 
in cross-examination and re-direct and did not recognize the inconsistencies in 
her testimony.90 Th e trial judge stressed how well she did as a witness and how 
her performance on the stand appeared to surpass her reported mental age of 6-8 
years, but then concluded that “[t]he signifi cant contradictions throughout her 
evidence on critical facts make her testimony unreliable.”91 Th e testimony of the 
accused was also inconsistent and contradictory, yet the trial judge relied on his 
contradictions as hallmarks of a “ring of truth.”92 
Th is analysis puts the complainant in an impossible position. It is as if she 
did not appear disabled enough to need assistance in her testimony yet the problems 
with that testimony, which may well have been aff ected by her disabilities, led 
to a reasonable doubt on the question of consent. Instead of making an inquiry 
into whether the contradictions could have been reconciled with some support 
during questioning, or whether they were a result of the complainant’s high level 
of suggestibility, the trial judge instead said that the contradictions led her to a 
fi nding of consent:
During the Crown’s re-examination J.I. contradicted most of what she had said in 
cross examination and essentially reverted to her fi rst story. She left the impression 
that she wanted to be friendly and accommodating and would agree, in what 
appeared to be a very sincere way, with whatever was suggested to her. At no time 
in direct examination, cross examination, or redirect examination did she seem 
uncertain about what she said. Neither did it appear that she did not understand the 
questions posed. Th roughout her answers were straightforward and appropriate, but 
88. Ibid at paras 7-10.
89. Ibid at paras 36, 38-39.
90. Ibid at paras 18, 28.
91. Ibid at paras 59-60.
92. Ibid at para 61.
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it was evident that she had no appreciation of the stark contradictions in what she 
was saying or their impact on the issues before the court.93 
Th e judge indicates that the witness appeared to understand all the questions 
yet admits that she did not recognize the blatant inconsistencies in her answers. 
Surely the fact that a witness with a mental disability does not even grasp that 
she has contradicted herself should have raised concerns during the trial and 
not simply be invoked to fi nd her evidence unreliable at the stage of the verdict. 
While contradictions may be a product of being unable to keep one’s false story 
straight, they may also be the product of confusion with the language chosen by 
the questioner, with the point of the question, or with the type of questions utilized. 
Even in direct examination, the Crown asked questions that required the 
complainant to analyze why the sexual acts were taking place and to off er an 
opinion on what the accused was thinking— tasks that required a high level of 
abstract thinking and that contributed little to the truth-seeking function:
In direct examination . . . [s]he said as they were having sex she told Mr. Prince it 
hurt “a bit”, but he still did it anyway. She said she felt “nervous” and “scared” and 
that she told him she did not want to have sex. When asked whether she thought he 
knew this she said, “I think so, yeah.” When asked why all of this was happening and 
what she thought about it, she said she did not really know. When asked to identify 
where he touched her, she did and said she was not comfortable at the time, but then 
said she never told Mr. Prince this. However, when asked what she thought should 
happen as a result of these events, she later said, “I think he should get charged for 
what he did.”
Again, and still in direct examination, J.I. said she thought Mr. Prince knew she 
did not want these things to happen. When asked why she thought this, she said, 
“I think he knew I did not think it would happen.” When pressed about what she 
meant by this she said, “He would not know it,” apparently referring to whether 
he knew she did not want to have sex, but she could not explain why. When it was 
put to her again by Crown counsel about whether Mr. Prince would know she was 
unwilling, she said emphatically, “He would not” and when again asked why, she 
said she did not really know.94
Reading this summary, the complainant appears to be most confused by 
questions asking her to speculate on the accused’s appreciation of her lack of 
consent. Th is is hardly surprising, since she is being asked to consider how her 
own behaviour and demeanour might have appeared to the accused and, in turn, 
how that would have aff ected his state of mind. Any answer she could have given 
93. Ibid at para 18.
94. Prince, supra note 87 at paras 11-12.
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to such a question would have been speculative and would have required a high 
level of lateral and abstract thinking to process and understand. 
 R v Poutawa,95 a New Zealand case, is instructive insofar as it demonstrates 
not only that the cross-examination of the complainant was clearly confusing 
to her, but also that intervention by the trial judge was able to help clarify the 
questioning. Th e complainant was an adult woman with an intellectual disability. 
She was described by the judge as having “a reading age of an eight to nine year 
old, and the verbal recognition skills about fi ve and a half to six year old. She had 
daily visits from caregivers who assisted her with medication, grocery shopping 
and fi nancial arrangements.”96 Th e accused was her neighbour who had visited 
the complainant and asked her to call a cab for him. On the way out he kissed her 
and later that day returned to her apartment after having been drinking. At some 
point he told her that he wanted to have sex with her and led her into the bedroom. 
Th e complainant indicated that she was scared of what he might do if she did 
not comply. He then had intercourse with her, followed by anal intercourse; the 
complainant then indicated that she did not want this and he stopped. At trial he 
was convicted on two counts of rape.
He appealed his conviction, arguing among other things that the assistance 
the trial judge gave the complainant showed partiality to the Crown. In particular, 
the trial judge interrupted cross-examination of the complainant four times to 
ask defence counsel to rephrase questions. At one point, the judge asked the 
complainant if she would like a break. Th e accused also contended that the trial 
judge addressed the complainant in a “soft and reassuring way … [that] would 
have engendered sympathy for her and prejudice against Mr Poutawa.”97 
Th e trial judge had relied on section 85 of the Evidence Act 2006,98 which 
allows a judge to intervene where he or she considers a question “improper, 
unfair, misleading, needlessly repetitive, or expressed in language that is too 
complicated for the witness to understand,” with mental disability being one 
of the factors the judge should consider before doing so.99 Th e Court of Appeal 
upheld the convictions, noting that defence counsel was using complex questions 
to make quite a sophisticated point and that it was appropriate for the trial judge 
to intervene to clarify them for the complainant. Th e following excerpt is taken 
from the cross-examination:
95. R v Poutawa, [2009] NZCA 482 [Poutawa].
96. Ibid at para 2.
97. Ibid at para 8.
98. (NZ), 2006/69 (NZLII).
99. Ibid at s 85(1)-(2).
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Q — I’m suggesting to you that he must have told you that or how else would 
u [sic] have known that’s what he wanted.
A — He told me he wanted sex.
JUDGE
Q — Where were you standing when he told you he wanted sex?
A — In the bedroom.
CROSS EXAMINATION: MR BULLOCK — CONTINUED
Q — Th at can’t be right [M] if you knew he wanted to have sex when you 
followed him to the bedroom, do you agree with that? Do you understand 
what I am asking you [M]?
A — Yes.
Q — You do, okay.
JUDGE
Q — [M] did you know before you went into the bedroom that he wanted 
to have sex?
A — No I didn’t.
CROSS EXAMINATION: MR BULLOCK — CONTINUED
Q — Why did you say then that you followed him to the bedroom because he 
wanted to have sex. Why when you were asked why you followed him to 
the bedroom did you answer, “He wanted to have sex with me”.
A — I don’t know. I’m all confused. I’m not sure.
Q — It’s because he’d said that before you went down there and that’s why you 
knew when you followed him.
JUDGE
Q — Did he say it to you before you went down to the bedroom?
A — When I went in the bedroom.
CROSS EXAMINATION: MR BULLOCK — CONTINUED
Q — So [M] if [Mr Poutawa] said that he had told you he wanted to have sex 
with you out by the back door you would disagree with that?
A — Yes.100
In agreeing with the trial judge’s interventions, the Court of Appeal noted:
To the extent there was any disruption to the fl ow of the cross-examination, that was 
necessary to ensure that questions were put fairly to the complainant. Mr Poutawa 
cannot claim then, to have been unfairly prejudiced by these interruptions.101
100. Poutawa, supra note 95 at para 15.
101. Ibid at paras 17-18.
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Canadian judges already have the authority to intervene in questioning that 
is confusing or inappropriate for a particular witness, even in the absence of the 
kind of legislation invoked here.102 We argue below, however, that specifi c legislative 
direction would be helpful in this context and that laws from New Zealand and 
Australia should be considered as possible models for Canada.
IV. EXISTING TESTIMONIAL ACCOMMODATIONS FOR 
WITNESSES WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 
What supports currently exist in Canadian law to deal with complainants who 
face the kinds of diffi  culties in testifying we have identifi ed? In the case of sexual 
assault prosecutions, specifi c accommodations for certain witnesses were formalized 
in the Code beginning in 1987.103 Th ese include the possibility of testifying 
behind a screen that blocks the complainant’s view of the accused, the use of a 
support person, and the possibility of testifying from another location by video 
link. While these accommodations are quite modest, all of them have been 
challenged at various times as undermining the right of the accused to a fair 
trial.104 Th ese accommodations should not necessarily be seen as exhausting the 
scope of accommodations that a trial judge can order under her inherent authority 
to control the trial process, although we have been unable to fi nd Canadian cases 
102. Th e Canadian appellate case law considering challenges to interventions by trial judges deals 
with issues other than intervention on behalf a witness who is confused or suggestible. Th e 
cases do affi  rm, however, that trial judges have the authority to ask questions of witnesses to 
clear up ambiguities and such interventions only attract appellate review when they appear to 
compromise the fairness of the trial. See R v Brouillard, [1985] 1 SCR 39, 17 CCC (3d) 193; 
R v Valley (1986), 26 CCC (3d) 207, 13 OAC 89 (CA); R v Hamilton, 2011 ONCA 399, 
271 CCC (3d) 208.
103. An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act, SC 1987, c 24, s 14. For 
further amendments, see An Act to amend certain Acts with respect to persons with disabilities, 
SC 1992, c 21, s 9.
104. Th e following challenges, all of which involved the accommodation of child witnesses and 
not witnesses with mental disabilities, were all ultimately unsuccessful. R v Levogiannis, 
[1993] 4 SCR 475, 25 CR (4th) 325 [Levogiannis] (involving a Charter challenge to the 
use of screen under previous legislation); R v JZS, 2008 BCCA 401, 61 CR (6th) 282 [JZS] 
(involving a Charter challenge to the use of screens under current legislation); R v CNH, 
2006 BCPC 119, 140 CRR (2d) 213 (involving a Charter challenge to testifying through 
CCTV and in the presence of a support person); R v R (ME) (1989), 49 CCC (3d) 475, 71 
CR (3d) 113 (NSCA) (involving a Charter challenge to testifying over CCTV); L(DO), supra 
note 15 (involving a Charter challenge to section 715.1 of the Criminal Code, which allows 
video-taped evidence to be introduced).
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in which trial judges provided additional accommodations for sexual assault 
complainants with mental disabilities. 
Most of the existing accommodations in the Code were designed to deal 
with child victims of sexual assault; however, they also apply to witnesses with 
disabilities, a linkage that we have challenged elsewhere as problematic.105 It is 
diffi  cult to fi nd case law dealing with these provisions in the context of people 
with disabilities. A recent study concluded:
Th e vulnerable adult witness provisions have been the subject of very little reported 
case law, and the survey indicates that there have been relatively few applications 
for the use of testimonial aids for adults. When applications are made for the use of 
testimonial aids for adults, they are generally successful, but they are less likely to be 
granted than applications for child witnesses.106
Some of the more extensive case law involving child witnesses is nonetheless 
helpful. Th is is not because adults with disabilities are analogous to children, 
nor because they necessarily have the same accommodation needs. Rather, these 
child-witness cases demonstrate that the courts have consistently held that these 
accommodations do not infringe on the fair trial rights of the accused.107 While 
the complainants in these cases are very diff erent, the implications for the fair 
trial rights of an accused are similar; for example, where a screen is used for a 
child complainant as where it is used for an adult complainant with a disability. 
A. SUPPORT PERSONS
Section 486.1 of the Code allows for a support person to be provided to a witness 
who is under eighteen or who has a disability. Th at support person is someone 
of the witness’s choice, although they cannot themselves be a witness in the 
proceedings.108 Most cases suggest that the role of the support person is just to 
be there and not to interact with the witness or the lawyer in any way. Section 
486.1(5) provides that the judge may order that the support person and the witness 
not communicate with each other while the witness testifi es.109 Subsection (6) 
105. Benedet & Grant, “Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief,” supra note 9. In fact, many of 
these accommodations would probably assist most sexual assault complainants regardless of 
their age or abilities.  
106. Canadian Research Institute for Law and the Family, Testimonial Support Provisions for 
Children and Vulnerable Adults (Bill C-2): Case Law Review and Perceptions of the Judiciary by 
Nicholas Bala et al (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2011) at x.
107. Prince, supra note 87.
108. Although there may be some discretion to allow a witness to be a support person where they 
have already testifi ed.
109. See e.g. R v Brown, 2010 SKQB 420 at para 7, 368 Sask R 69 [Brown]; R v MF, 2010 
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prevents any adverse inference from being drawn from the fact that an order was 
or was not made under this section. For a witness under eighteen or a person with 
a mental or physical disability, the provision is worded in presumptive language 
such that if the Crown applies for a support person, the judge shall order it unless he 
or she is of the opinion that the order would “interfere with the proper adminis-
tration of justice.”110 
When dealing with witnesses with disabilities, the most common support 
persons requested are victim services support workers, although in some cases the 
witness may ask a friend or family member.111 In our view, the presence of a support 
person is a good start in terms of making a complainant with a disability feel 
secure enough to tell her story. However, as we will discuss below, it does nothing 
to facilitate the communication of her evidence, particularly in the face of what 
can sometimes be confusing and diffi  cult questions on the witness stand. 
B. TESTIMONY OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM OR BEHIND A SCREEN 
Section 486.2(1) provides that a witness who is able to communicate evidence 
but has diffi  culty doing so because of her physical or mental disability may testify 
outside the courtroom or behind a screen or other device that would allow the 
witness not to see the accused. Again, the order must be granted on application 
by the Crown unless the judge determines that it would “interfere with the proper 
administration of justice.”112 Th is section also provides that a witness shall not 
testify outside the courtroom unless arrangements are made for the accused, the 
judge, and the jury to watch the testimony by means of closed circuit television, 
and that the accused is permitted to communicate with counsel while watching 
the testimony. 
Prior to 2006,113 both of these provisions required a pre-testimonial inquiry 
to determine whether the testimonial aid was necessary to obtain a full and candid 
ONSC 4018 at para 97, [2010] OJ no 3578; R v Aikoriogie, 2004 ONCJ 96 at para 8, 62 
WCB (2d) 118; R v JW, 2007 BCPC 81 at para 2, [2007] BCWLD 4522. Th e case law 
demonstrates that this order is commonly made but not discussed.
110. In the version of section 486.1(2) in force prior to 2007, the order was discretionary; the 
subsection then stated that the judge will only order a support person if he or she is of the 
opinion that “the order is necessary to obtain a full and candid account from the witness of 
the acts complained of.” Code, supra note 11, s 486.1(2).
111. Bala et al, supra note 106 at 52.
112. Subsection 2 provides for use of these devices with other witnesses if it is necessary to obtain 
a full and candid account from the witness of the acts complained of. Code, supra note 11, ss 
486.1(1)-(2).
113. An Act to amend the Criminal Code (protection of children and other vulnerable persons) and the 
Canada Evidence Act, SC 2005, c 32.
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account of the acts at issue. Under the current legislation, it is not necessary 
to establish a need for these accommodations; the court is mandated to grant 
them unless they interfere with the proper administration of justice. However, 
the right to these aids for witnesses with mental disabilities is not absolute, as it is 
for children. Th e Crown must fi rst establish that the witness will have diffi  culty 
communicating her evidence because of a disability. 
Th e situation is further complicated by the permissive provision applicable 
to all witnesses under section 486.2(2). It allows for an application to testify 
behind a screen or to testify outside the courtroom for any witness if it is necessary 
to obtain a full and candid account from that witness, echoing the language of 
the provision as it existed for vulnerable witnesses prior to 2006. Th e criteria for 
determining whether to allow either measure are the same as those for allowing a 
support person. One of those criteria is whether the witness has a mental or physical 
disability, which might suggest that disability is not automatically grounds for 
accommodation under section 486.2(1).
While we applaud eff orts to extend the possibility of this accommodation to 
other witnesses, this overlap is problematic because we believe the presumptive 
language of section 486.2(1) should prevail for all complainants with mental 
disabilities. Th e question of whether the complainant will have diffi  culty giving 
her evidence is often impossible to determine until she has actually testifi ed. 
Courts have disagreed as to whether judges retain the discretion to determine 
which of these means of testifying will be used. For example, in British Columbia, 
the courts have held that the judge must order the type of accommodation sought 
by the Crown under this section, and that the judge has no discretion to depart 
from the Crown’s request unless it would interfere with the administration of 
justice.114 In Manitoba, by contrast, the Court of Queen’s Bench has suggested 
that it is within the discretion of the trial judge to control the trial process and 
that he or she has the authority to choose between the types of accommodation 
provided for in this section.115 Th is latter approach appears contrary to the 
legislative intent in making the section automatic. Allowing the judge discretion 
to choose the method of accommodation will inevitably result in inquiries into 
which type of accommodation is necessary to get a full and candid account 
from the witness—precisely the type of assessment these amendments were 
designed to avoid.
114. R v SBT, 2008 BCSC 711 at paras 36-40, 232 CCC (3d) 115.
115. R v CTL, 2009 MBQB 266 at paras 16-19, 246 Man R (2d) 170. In Brown, the 
Saskatchewan Queen’s Bench preferred this approach over that taken by the BCSC. Supra 
note 109.
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In order to understand the minimal intrusion on the trial process resulting 
from the use of a screen, it is important to stress how a screen operates. Th e 
screen merely blocks the complainant’s view of the accused. Th e accused and 
other participants in the courtroom still have a full view of the witness. As Justice 
L’Heureux-Dubé described in Levogiannis,
Th e screen does not obstruct the view of the complainant by the accused, his counsel, 
the Crown or the judge. All are present in court. Th e evidence is given and the trial 
is conducted in the usual manner, including cross-examination. As a result, the issue 
before this Court, is, simply put, whether a witness’s obstructed view of an accused, 
infringes the rights of such accused under s. 7 or 11(d) of the Charter.116
Th us, all that is ‘lost’ is the complainant’s view of the accused. Only if we 
assume that the accused has a right to intimidate the complainant by his presence or 
facial expressions can this measure be seen as a violation of his rights. As one judge 
put it, there is no right on the part of the accused to glower at a complainant.117 
In Levogiannis118 the predecessor section, which vested the trial judge with 
the discretion to order a screen, was upheld against a constitutional challenge 
in the context of a sexual assault prosecution involving a child. Th e Court, per 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, held that the section did not infringe on the accused’s 
fair trial rights because its purpose was to facilitate the truth-seeking function by 
enabling the complainant to be able to give her evidence more fully and candidly. 
In JZS,119 the accused challenged the constitutionality of the current provisions. 
Th e defence argued that the provisions’ presumptive nature distinguished them 
from the legislation that was upheld in Levogiannis. Th e Charter challenge focused 
on the fact that the new provisions had shifted the process for determining the 
type of testimonial aids necessary from the court to the Crown. Th e accused was 
convicted of sexually assaulting his son and daughter, who were eight and eleven 
by the time of the trial. Both children testifi ed behind a screen on a promise to 
tell the truth. It was argued that using the screen and testifying on a promise to 
116. Levogiannis, supra note 104 at para 17.
117. R v Accused (T4/88), [1989] 1 NZLR 660 (CA). McMullin J, concurring, cited in R v 
Levogiannis (1990), 1 OR (3d) 351 at para 35, 62 CCC (3d) 59 (CA). McMullin J said, 
“Confrontation in the sense of being in the presence of one’s accusers is one thing; but 
confrontation merely to aff ord the opportunity to glower at and thereby intimidate witnesses 
is another. Th e sight of an accused person from whose actions a child has lived in terror in 
the past is very likely to intimidate that child in the giving of evidence about that accused, 
particularly when the evidence involves him in incidents of the most intimate and degrading 
kind.”
118. Levogiannis, supra note 104 at paras 43-44.
119. JZS, supra note 104 at para 14.
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tell the truth rather than under oath violated the fair trial rights of the accused 
under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.120 
Th e British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the 
presumptive nature of the legislation justifi ed a departure from Levogiannis. Th e 
court noted that Justice L’Heureux-Dubé had framed the issue as “simply put, 
whether a witness’ obstructed view of an accused, infringes the rights of such 
accused under section 7 or 11(d) of the Charter.”121 Relying on a decision of the 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, Justice Smith held:
Th e right to face one’s accusers is not in this day and age to be taken in the literal 
sense. In my opinion, it is simply the right of an accused person to be present in 
court, to hear the case against him and to make answer and defence to it.122
A physical screen can be awkward to use and may in itself be intimidating for 
some complainants, although one English study suggests that complainants generally 
appreciate the screen and would prefer to use one if given the opportunity.123 
Th e Code also provides the possibility of testimony by live video link, which 
aff ords the complainant more freedom and could permit him or her to testify 
from familiar or comfortable surroundings.124 Th is method too has its drawbacks. 
Even if the equipment functions perfectly, it may be benefi cial for the judge and 
jury to have the immediacy that comes from being in the same room as the 
complainant. Also, the video-link room may itself seem isolated and unfriendly.125 
C. VIDEO RECORDINGS 
Th e screen, the support person, and the video link are all measures designed to 
increase the psychological comfort of the witness in the hope that he or she will 
be better able to testify to the events at issue. None of these accommodations alter 
120. Ibid.
121. Charter, supra note 4, ss 7, 11(d).
122. Ibid at para 34, citing R v R (ME) (1989), 49 CCC (3d) 475 at 484, 90 NSR (2d) 439 (CA).
123. UK, Home Offi  ce Research, Are special measures working? Evidence from surveys of vulnerable 
and intimidated witnesses (Research Study 283) (London: Home Offi  ce, 2004), online: 
<http://library.npia.police.uk/docs/hors/hors283.pdf> at 71, 79. In particular, twenty-two of 
twenty-seven witnesses who used screens considered them to be helpful.
124. For example, in Harper, the complainant testifi ed from the long term care facility in which 
she resided. She suff ered from a severe form of multiple sclerosis, which severely aff ected 
her memory and rendered her unable to walk. After medical evidence indicated she would 
function better in familiar surroundings and with her care worker present, the trial judge 
ordered that she be permitted to testify from her home. Supra note 5 at para 6.
125. Allison Riding, “Th e Crown Court Witness Service: Little Help in the Witness Box” (1999) 
38:4 Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 411 at 413.
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the requirement that the complainant give live evidence in the trial. Th ere is one 
accommodation in the Code, however, that can be used to limit the requirement for 
such testimony. Section 715.2 provides that if a witness with a disability is able to 
communicate evidence but has diffi  culty doing so because of this disability, a video 
recording made within a reasonable time after the alleged off ence in which he or 
she describes the acts complained of is admissible if he or she adopts the contents 
of the video. Th e trial judge has the discretion not to allow the admission of 
the video if such admission would interfere with the proper administration of 
justice.126 Th e limitation of this option is that the witness is still subject to cross-
examination on the contents of the video.
Most judges are willing to utilize these provisions to admit video-recorded 
evidence. One problem, however, may be the weight given by judges (or juries) 
to such evidence, especially where the complainant can no longer clearly remember 
the events and may contradict some of the earlier statements made in her 
trial testimony. Th is problem may be particularly acute where the complainant 
has serious memory defi cits and may not be able to confi rm in court that the 
statements made are true (because he or she does not remember making the 
recording).127 In R v CCF,128 the Court held that the witness must remember “giving 
the statement and … [must testify] that she was then attempting to be honest 
and truthful.”129 It is not necessary that the witness have a present recollection 
of the events in question because this requirement can make cross-examination 
diffi  cult if the witness does not recall the events fully. Section 715.2 has been 
upheld (in the context of child witnesses) by a unanimous Court as not violating 
the accused’s right to a fair trial.130 Th e Court held that there is no right to have 
cross-examination occur contemporaneously with the giving of evidence.
Most of the accommodations discussed thus far are relatively noncontroversial131 
and provide some support for people with disabilities testifying in sexual assault 
cases. It is surprising, therefore, that we do not see more applications for their 
use in this context. Th e more important point, however, is that they appear to be 
fairly modest in their impact. Certainly they do not change anything about the 
126. Th e Code provides other measures to facilitate the participation of sexual assault 
complainants, such as publication bans and provisions not allowing the accused to personally 
cross-examine the complainant, but none of these are targeted at the specifi c needs of 
witnesses with disabilities and we do not discuss them here.
127. Harper, supra note 5 at para 55.
128. [1997] 3 SCR 1183, 154 DLR (4th) 13.
129. Ibid at para 36.
130. L(DO), supra note 15.
131. Bala et al, supra note 106 at 61.
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questioning that the witness must undergo, with the exception of shortening the 
examination-in-chief where a video-recorded statement is used. 
Th ese accommodations appear to focus on making a complainant more 
comfortable in the witness box either by, for example, blocking her view of the 
accused, having a familiar person with him or her, or by allowing her evidence to 
be admitted through a video link rather than live testimony. Such accommodations 
assume that if we can make a witness more comfortable with her surroundings, we 
will get better testimony from him or her. However, in our view, these provisions do 
little to actually address the problems we see in the process of getting that evidence 
from the complainant, either through direct examination or cross-examination, 
and hence do not deal adequately with the problems we are addressing in this 
article. It is important to make all complainants as comfortable as possible when 
testifying in a sexual assault trial. But, particularly with this group of witnesses, 
such measures fall short of ensuring that their testimony is acquired in a fair manner 
that contributes to, rather than hinders, the truth-seeking process.
D. INTERMEDIARIES FOR WITNESSES WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 
Th ere is no one simple accommodation that will address the diffi  culties with 
cross-examination. Judges and lawyers need to be educated about the kinds of 
assistance witnesses may need, and assumptions about the inviolability of unfettered 
cross-examination need to be confronted. It is insuffi  cient to try and factor in the 
eff ects of the complainant’s disability only at the fi nal stage of weighing the evidence 
as a way of off setting problems with the examination and cross-examination 
of the witness. Instead, trial judges must do what they can to understand the 
challenges that the particular witness is facing and insist that questions be broken 
down into simple parts and that negative and closed leading questions be avoided 
where they are likely to produce refl exive compliance on the part of the witness. 
Th e problem with relying entirely on trial judges, however, is that they may 
not have any detailed understanding of the challenges faced by a particular 
complainant. While they can be expected to try to control overly complex questions, 
they may not be aware that a particular question is confusing to the witness. 
Clearly, more personalized support is needed. We argue that the use of 
intermediaries would be a signifi cant positive development in Canada for sexual 
assault complainants with mental disabilities. Th ese are trained individuals who can 
assist a witness both in understanding the questions asked and in communicating 
her answers. Th ey can also help to prepare the judge and lawyers in advance of 
the trial to understand the abilities of the particular complainant so that dif-
fi culties can be anticipated and avoided. Intermediaries go beyond the role of 
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interpreters in that they can suggest what kinds of questions are confusing and how 
questions might be asked in a simpler or more understandable way. Intermediaries 
could be used eff ectively at all stages of the process, from police questioning 
to testifying at trial. 
England has the most developed system of intermediaries that we have found. 
In England and Wales, the Youth Justice and Evidence Act 1999132 authorizes the use 
of “special measures” to assist vulnerable witnesses.133 Witnesses may be eligible 
for special measures because of their age, mental capacity, fear, or distress. Section 
16134 sets out which witnesses are eligible for special measures on grounds of 
age or incapacity. Witnesses with mental disabilities are eligible, although special 
measures are only available for such witnesses if the “quality” of their evidence 
(as defi ned in section 16(5)) would be diminished by reason of the disability.135
One special measure available to section 16 witnesses is the use of an 
intermediary, set out in section 29.136 Th e intermediary may be quite active 
in the proceedings, “translating” both the questions put to the witness and the 
witness’ answers while also explaining the questions or responses where necessary. 
132. (UK), c 23 [YJEA 1999].
133. Ibid at s 23-30.
134. Th is section has been in force since 24 July 2002. Th e Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
1999 (Commencement No. 7) Order 2002, SI 2002/1739.
135. YJEA 1999, supra note 132, s 16 (1)-(2), (5). Th e relevant parts of section 16 read as follows:
16. Witnesses eligible for assistance on grounds of age or incapacity.
 (1)  For the purposes of this Chapter a witness in criminal proceedings (other than the 
accused) is eligible for assistance by virtue of this section—
  (a)  if under the age of 17 at the time of the hearing; or
  (b)  if the court considers that the quality of evidence given by the witness is 
likely to be diminished by reason of any circumstances falling within subsec-
tion (2).
 (2)  Th e circumstances falling within this subsection are—
  (a)  that the witness—
   (i)  suff ers from mental disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health 
Act 1983, or
   (ii)   otherwise has a signifi cant impairment of intelligence and social 
functioning;
  (b)  that the witness has a physical disability or is suff ering from a physical 
disorder.
….
(5)  In this Chapter references to the quality of a witness’s evidence are to its quality in terms 
of completeness, coherence and accuracy; and for this purpose “coherence” refers to a 
witness’s ability in giving evidence to give answers which address the questions put to the 
witness and can be understood both individually and collectively. 
136. YJEA 1999, supra note 132, s 29.
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Th e purpose of an intermediary is set out in section 29(2):
Th e function of an intermediary is to communicate—
(a)  to the witness, questions put to the witness, and
(b)  to any person asking such questions, the answers given by the witness in 
reply to them,
and to explain such questions or answers so far as necessary to enable them to be 
understood by the witness or person in question.137
In the 2007 review of intermediary pilot projects,138 the authors described 
how intermediaries work in a court setting. While the authors do not provide any 
citations for the cases they describe, the report is instructive. 
During cross-examination, intermediaries can fl ag non-comprehension of 
questions. Judges can instruct the witness to alert the intermediary when a question 
in cross-examination is not understood. Intermediaries can also intervene of their 
own accord. Th e following exchange is illustrative:
Defence barrister:  When you went to speak to the police ladies, do you know why 
you went to speak to them? 
Intermediary:  Your Honour, L fi nds it diffi  cult to understand ‘Why’ ques-
tions.
Judge:   Defence counsel will re-phrase the question.
Defence barrister:  You remember going to the police station?139
Intermediaries prepare reports to familiarize the court with the particular 
witness’ needs. As a result of an intermediary’s report, at least one judge was able 
to intervene when questions became too complex.
[A] defence barrister asked a witness whether the money he received weekly was 
more or less than a certain sum. Th e judge referred to the report to emphasise that 
the witness was likely to have diffi  culty with comparative questions.140
Another defence lawyer stated that he or she used the intermediary report 
when preparing an appropriate cross-examination.141 However, not all advocates 
were willing to modify their style of questioning:
137. Ibid at s 29(2).
138. Joyce Plotnikoff  & Richard Woolfson, Th e ‘Go-Between’: evaluation of intermediary pathfi nder 
projects (Lexicon Limited, 2007), online: <http://www.lexiconlimited.co.uk/PDF%20fi les/
Intermediaries_study_report.pdf>.
139. Ibid at 53.
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid at 44.
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[A]dvocates’ ability to modify their style of questioning varied widely. Some adapted 
their questions in light of information in intermediary reports. Th ree defence 
barristers were particularly careful to speak slowly, mostly use short questions, follow a 
chronological order and ‘signpost’ a change of subject. Some problematic approaches 
persisted despite interventions by the intermediary and sometimes by the judge or 
magistrates. Nearly all intermediary interventions concerning questions were seen as 
appropriate. However, views of appropriateness were closely linked to the ability of 
advocates to take account of intermediary guidance. Where advocates did not modify 
their questioning style the rate of intermediary interventions tended to increase, in 
a few instances exposing the intermediary to comments from advocates that they 
had intervened too often. Some prosecution advocates, however, thought that 
intermediaries had not intervened enough.142
Th e mere presence of an intermediary may help slow things down for a 
complainant with a mental disability, which can increase her ability to understand 
the questioning in cross-examination.143
In some cases, pre-trial hearings can be used to lay the ground rules for 
questioning and the timing of judges’ interventions. For example:
Th e judge set the following ground rules: when the advocate asked a question, the 
intermediary would say when there was a problem; the advocate would then re-
phrase; if the intermediary said there was still a problem, the intermediary would be 
entitled, with the judge’s authority, to put the substance of the question in a simpler 
way; and the intermediary would intervene in answers only on request.144
Laying ground rules in this fashion can both reduce misunderstanding of the 
role of the intermediary during cross-examination and respond to the criticism 
that the intermediary may improperly cross the line into the role of advocate for 
the complainant. Th is is less likely to happen where the intermediary can voice 
concerns with the questions before the witness attempts to answer them, rather 
than after the fact on the basis that the answer given was unsatisfactory.
Intermediaries are also able to re-phrase questions.145 Although this often 
worked well, there were some concerns with specifi c interventions. Some magistrates 
were concerned that “interventions by intermediaries could ‘lead to a danger of 
advocates losing the fl ow and of misinterpretation.’”146 While these are important 
concerns, it appears that the introduction of intermediaries has been a promising 
142. Ibid at 52.
143. Ibid at 53.
144. Ibid at 45.
145. Ibid at 53.
146. Ibid at 54.
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development for criminal trials in England and Wales and that the intention is to 
continue with their use.
Intermediaries are not only useful in courtroom settings but also in police 
interviews of witnesses. Th ey can assist in having the complainant’s story understood 
at the earliest stages of the process and in preparing the prosecution and court for 
the needs of the particular witness.147 
Th e creation of an intermediary report, in which the intermediary describes 
the specifi c needs of the witness, allows counsel to modify their style of questioning 
and enables judges to intervene more confi dently. Pre-trial hearings and rules 
established before trial allow all parties to understand what interventions are 
appropriate, reduces concerns during the trial, and improves the smooth conduct 
of the trial.
Intermediaries are available in other jurisdictions as well. New Zealand and a 
number of jurisdictions in Australia also allow intermediaries to be used in child 
sexual assault trials, but they have not been extended to adult witnesses with 
disabilities.148 In South Africa, intermediaries were available only for child 
witnesses until 2007. In 2007, section 170A(1) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Of-
fences and Related Matters) Act was amended to extend eligibility for intermediaries 
to some adults with disabilities, although disability is defi ned in terms of being 
under the mental age of eighteen years.149 
In our view, it is problematic to defi ne the need for an intermediary based 
on some notion of a particular mental age rather than on the supports the witness 
needs to have her evidence fully heard in court. Th e language of this legislation 
has resulted in some diffi  culties with the implementation of the law. Th e 
requirement that testifying would expose the witness to “undue” stress or suff ering 
147. R v Watts, [2010] EWCA Crim 1824, [2011] 1 Crim LR 58 at 61.
148. See generally Annie Cossins, “Cross-Examination in Child Sexual Assault Trials: Evidentiary 
Safeguard or an Opportunity to Confuse?” (2009) 33:1 Melbourne UL Rev 68; Elisabeth 
McDonald & Yvette Tinsley, “Use of alternative ways of giving evidence by vulnerable 
witnesses: Current proposals, issues and challenges” (Victoria: University of Wellington Legal 
Research Paper No 2, 2011), online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1885145> [Cossins]. Th e current status of intermediaries in New Zealand is uncertain, 
as the Evidence Act 2006 removed the explicit reference to intermediaries and enacted 
a provision allowing for “communication assistance.” If “communication assistance” is 
interpreted to include intermediaries, then the new Act may in fact extend the availability 
of intermediaries to both children and adults. (NZ), 2006/69, ss 80-81. See Emma Davies, 
Emily Henderson & Kirsten Hanna, “Facilitating children to give best evidence: Are there 
better ways to challenge children’s testimony?” (2010) 34:4 Crim LJ 347. 
149. (S Afr), No 32 of 2007 [emphasis added].
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has been interpreted by the courts as imposing a very high standard.150 In S v 
Stefaans,151 the Cape High Court reasoned that since complainants in sexual 
off ence cases are invariably exposed to severe trauma, “undue connotes a degree 
of stress greater than the ordinary stress to which witnesses, including witnesses in 
complaints of off ences of a sexual nature, are subject to.”152 Furthermore, the use 
of “may” in the statute leaves the magistrate with signifi cant discretion to choose 
whether or not to involve an intermediary. Th us, even if testifying would expose 
the witness to undue trauma, the magistrate may still choose not to appoint an 
intermediary. Th ere is some speculation that this has resulted in inconsistency in 
the use of intermediaries.153
Scotland has also considered introducing intermediaries.154 However, under 
their common law inherent powers, courts are already using “appropriate adults” 
to act as intermediaries in some situations.155 Although this practice is described 
as “widespread,”156 it is diffi  cult to fi nd specifi c examples of the use of an 
“appropriate adult” in the courtroom or during cross-examination. Appropriate 
adults are envisioned as primarily providing aid during police investigations,157 
although the guidelines indicate that appropriate adults may be used in court:
2.5 Th e primary role of the appropriate adult is to facilitate communication, in 
addition to this their presence may also provide support and reassurance for an indi-
vidual with a mental disorder (witness, victim, suspect, accused) at police interview, 
specifi c forensic procedures or examination, precognition and at court.158
150. Ibid, s 170A(1).
151. [1999] 1 All SA 191, 1999 (1) SACR 182(C).
152. S v Manqaba 2005 (2) SACR 489 (W) at 187B, cited in Carmel R Matthias & F Noel Zaal, 
“Intermediaries for Child Witnesses: Old Problems, New Solutions and Judicial Diff erences 
in South Africa” (2011) 19:2 Int’l J Child Rts 251 at 257.
153. In S v F 1999 (1) SACR 571 (C) “a court went so far as to refuse appointment of an 
intermediary even after evidence by a psychiatrist that a child who had been raped was 
suff ering from post-traumatic stress disorder.” Ibid at 258.
154. Scottish Government Justice and Communities Victims and Witnesses Unit, Consultation 
Paper on the Use of Intermediaries for Vulnerable Witnesses in Scotland, (Edinburgh: 2007), 
online: <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2007/10/09143729/0> [Scotland, 
Consultation Paper].
155. Scottish Government, “Appropriate Adults,” online: <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/
Justice/law/victims-witnesses/Appropriate-Adult> [Scotland, “Appropriate Adults”].
156. Scotland, Consultation Paper, supra note 154 at para 12.
157. Scotland, “Appropriate Adults,” supra note 155.
158. Scotland, Guidance on Appropriate Adult Services in Scotland, (2007) at para 2.5, online: 
<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/1099/0053903.pdf> [Scotland, Guidance].
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Anecdotal evidence indicates that the extension of appropriate adults into 
the courtroom occurs on an ad hoc basis and with varying degrees of success.159 
England also has a codifi ed appropriate adult scheme that does not extend to the 
courtroom.160 
Canadian courts have recognized that witnesses with mental disabilities have 
a right to equality without discrimination in the courtroom.161 As the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal has noted:
We must, of course, ensure that those with mental and physical disabilities receive 
equal protection of the law guaranteed to everyone by s. 15 of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms. Th is will sometimes require that their evidence be presented 
along with the evidence of others who are able to explain, support and supplement 
it, so that, to the extent that this is possible, the court will receive the account which 
the witness would have given had he or she not been disabled.162
We read this statement not as an expectation that non-disabled adults should 
be used to ‘fi x’ the evidence of those with disabilities in order to make it ‘normal,’ 
but rather as an endorsement of the idea that access to justice must take into 
account systemic inequalities. Th e court goes on to note:
But the evidence will, of course, still have to meet the high standard of proof always 
required when criminal charges are involved, because the liberty of the accused, and 
the importance of guarding against the injustice of convicting the innocent, require 
in these cases as much as any other a “solid foundation for a verdict of guilt.”163
We believe the development of a program of trained intermediaries in Canada 
would improve the ability of this group of complainants to have their stories told 
to a court. Intermediaries could help with police questioning, plan the neces-
159. British Psychological Society, “Response to the Scottish Government consultation: Th e Use 
of Intermediaries for Vulnerable Witnesses in Scotland” (2008) at 4, online: <http://scotland.
gov.uk/Resource/Doc/214745/0057298.pdf>.
160. It is enacted in Code C of the Codes of Practice. Home Offi  ce, (1 November 2011), online: 
<http://www.homeoffi  ce.gov.uk/police/powers/pace-codes/> [Codes of Practice]. Th e Codes of 
Practice are issued by the Secretary of State pursuant to power granted by section 66 of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. (UK), c 60, s 66.
161. Th e right to equality in legal proceedings also has international recognition in the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 30 March 2007, 2515 UNTS 3, 46 ILM 443, art 13,
13. States Parties shall ensure eff ective access to justice for persons with disabilities on an equal 
basis with others, including through the provision of procedural and age-appropriate accom-
modations, in order to facilitate their eff ective role as direct and indirect participants, including 
as witnesses, in all legal proceedings, including at investigative and other preliminary stages.
162. R v Pearson (1994), 82 BCAC 1 at para 36, 36 CR (4th) 343 [emphasis added].
163. Ibid (citation omitted).
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sary accommodations for the court process, inform the judge about possible 
diffi  culties the witness might experience in testifying, and assist in the direct 
and cross-examination processes. Careful use of intermediaries could increase the 
likelihood that a witness will be able to testify and have her evidence heard. In 
our view, this bolsters rather than detracts from the solid foundation underlying 
a guilty verdict and, as we discuss in more detail below in this Part, is entirely 
consistent with the fair trial rights of the accused. 
Of course, we recognize that such accommodations will not solve all of the 
problems faced by women with mental disabilities who complain of sexual assault. 
Th e fact remains that as long as witnesses with mental disabilities tend to be 
equated with young children,164 stereotyped as hypersexual165 or as unable to tell 
the truth,166 they will continue to face even more barriers in sexual assault pros-
ecutions than other witnesses. In this context, we think it is important that the 
accommodations and testimonial supports off ered to complainants in these cases 
be more substantive than a screen and a support person sitting nearby. We also 
think it is important that more active support, like intermediaries, be viewed not 
strictly as aid for persons with mental disabilities but as necessary guidance to 
allow non-disabled participants in the criminal justice system to overcome their 
own lack of knowledge so as to interact meaningfully with these complainants.
E. GIVING JUDGES LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO INTERVENE TO SUPPORT 
WITNESSES 
As mentioned earlier in the discussion of Poutawa,167 there is precedent in other 
jurisdictions for instructing judges to take a more active role in preventing the 
kinds of questions that do not elicit useful evidence from a witness with a 
mental disability. Most Australian jurisdictions have legislation that directs 
trial judges to intervene when questions are inappropriate.168 In New South 
164. See e.g. ICH Clare & GH Gudjonsson, “Interrogative suggestibility, confabulation, and 
acquiescence in people with mild learning disabilities (mental handicap): Implications for 
reliability during police interrogations” (1993) 32:3 British J of Clinical Psychology 295.
165. See e.g. the trial decision in R v Alsadi (27 July 2011), Vancouver 213734-2-C (BC Prov Ct) 
and Harper, supra note 5 at para 16.
166. Dinardo, supra note 29 at para 6.
167. Supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
168. See Cossins, supra note 148 at 93. In 1995, the Australian Commonwealth, New South 
Wales, and Tasmania enacted uniform evidence acts, which included a provision giving 
judges the discretion to disallow misleading or intimidating questions, taking into account 
any mental disability on the part of the witness. Similar legislation is in place in all the other 
Australian jurisdictions, although they have not explicitly adopted the Uniform Evidence Act. 
For instance, Evidence Act 1939 (NT), s 16 reads as follows:
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Wales, for example, the court must disallow a question put to a witness in 
cross-examination if it: 
(a)  is misleading or confusing, or
(b)  is unduly annoying, harassing, intimidating, off ensive, oppressive, humiliating 
or repetitive, or
(c)  is put to the witness in a manner or tone that is belittling, insulting or otherwise 
inappropriate, or
(d)  has no basis other than a stereotype (for example, a stereotype based on the 
witness’s sex, race, culture, ethnicity, age or mental, intellectual or physical 
disability).169
Th e court must consider a number of factors, including mental and physical 
disability.170 A question will not be disallowed merely because it challenges the 
truthfulness or the accuracy of the witness.171
Th e New South Wales legislation makes intervention mandatory; objec-
tion by opposing counsel is not required to trigger the duty to intervene. 
Queensland, by contrast, casts the authority to intervene in permissive 
terms.172 While such a law does not on its own give judges all the tools they 
need to grasp what kinds of questions might be improper for a particular 
witness, it does make clear that the right to cross-examine is not unlimited 
and that a one-size-fi ts-all approach to cross-examination is inconsistent with 
substantive equality.
16 Disallowance of question
 (1)  Th e Court may disallow any question that the Court considers to be misleading, 
confusing, annoying, harassing, intimidating, off ensive, repetitive or phrased in 
inappropriate language.
 (2)  In determining whether to disallow a question, the Court must have regard to:
  (a)  any relevant condition, attribute or characteristic of the witness, including:
   (i)  the age, maturity and cultural background of the witness; and
   (ii)  any mental, intellectual or physical characteristic of the witness; and  
  (b)  if the witness is a child – the principles set out in section 21D.
 In 2005, the Uniform Evidence Act was amended to remove the judicial discretion to allow 
improper questions, and the list of impermissible questions was expanded. Th e new uniform 
evidence act has since been enacted in New South Wales, the Commonwealth, the Australian 
Capital Territory, and substantially in Victoria. See e.g. Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 41-42.
169. Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 41(1).
170. Ibid, s 41(2)(b).
171. Ibid, s 41(3)(a).
172. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 21, as enacted by Criminal Law Amendment Act 2000 No 43 
(Qld), s 45.
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V. TOWARDS THE FAIR TRIAL
In Canada, where the fair trial rights of the accused are constitutionally protect-
ed, opposition to the reforms proposed in this paper is likely to be grounded 
in section 7 of the Charter. Th e concern is that if cross-examination is fettered in 
any way, if it is rendered less aggressive, or if a third party mediates the questioning, 
then the accused’s right to confront his accuser and to challenge the prosecution’s 
case is diminished, thereby undermining his right to make full answer and 
defence under section 7. Th e Court has recognized that the right to cross-
examine Crown witnesses “without signifi cant and unwarranted constraint” is 
protected as part of the right to make full answer and defence.173
 However, the Court has also made clear that while the right to cross-examine 
is important, it is not unlimited and must not be abused. Lawyers are not permitted 
to harass witnesses, to engage in misrepresentation or repetitiousness, or to ask 
questions the prejudicial eff ect of which outweighs their probative value.174 Trial 
judges have broad discretion to ensure fairness and to see that justice is done.175 
Our view is that an abstract consideration of the boundaries of the right 
to make full answer and defence through cross-examination is unhelpful. Th e 
Court recognized this in its discussion of the admissibility of hearsay evidence 
in R v Khelawon:
… the constitutional right guaranteed under s. 7 of the Charter is not the right to 
confront or cross-examine adverse witnesses in itself. Th e adversarial trial process, 
which includes cross-examination, is but the means to achieve the end. Trial fairness, 
as a principle of fundamental justice, is the end that must be achieved. Trial fairness 
embraces more than the rights of the accused. While it undoubtedly includes the 
right to make full answer and defence, the fairness of the trial must be assessed in the 
light of broader societal concerns.176
Th ose concerns include recognition that in the context of sexual assault, sec-
tions “15 and 28 of the Charter guaranteeing equality to men and women, although 
not determinative should be taken into account in determining the reasonable limita-
tions that should be placed upon the cross-examination of a complainant … .”177 
Where the sexual assault trial involves a witness with a mental disability, the 
right to equality must also include consideration of disability and sex as intersecting 
173. R v Lyttle, 2004 SCC 5 at para 2, [2004] 1 SCR 193.
174. Ibid at para 44.
175. Ibid at para 45.
176. 2006 SCC 57 at para 48, [2006] 2 SCR 787.
177. R v Osolin, [1993] 4 SCR 595 at 669, 86 CCC (3d) 481 [emphasis omitted].
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grounds of discrimination. Taking steps to ensure that witnesses with mental 
disabilities give as full and candid an account as possible enhances the fairness of 
the trial and the search for the truth. As one Australian judge has noted:
Th e diffi  culties encountered by complainants in sexual assault cases in the criminal 
justice system have been a focus of concern for several decades. Judges play an 
important role in protecting complainants from unnecessary, inappropriate and 
irrelevant questioning by or on behalf of an accused. Th at role is perfectly consistent 
with the requirements of a fair trial, which requirements do not involve treating the 
criminal justice system as if it were a forensic game in which every accused is entitled 
to some kind of sporting chance.178
 Th us, we are of the view that giving trial judges the responsibility to intervene 
to ensure that witnesses are questioned fairly is entirely consistent with section 7 
of the Charter. 
Th e use of intermediaries may also be challenged as a limitation on defence 
counsel’s ability to challenge a witness. In one particular case cited in the English 
pilot project, the intermediary asked that a complex cross-examination question be 
broken up into parts because she suspected from the response that the question had 
not been understood by a child witness. Defence counsel commented:
Th e intermediary must not interpose their sense of what doesn’t fi t on answers 
apparently inconsistent with the evidence-in-chief by dressing it up as “Th e witness 
did not understand the question.” I was OK about this instance but it is a very 
fi ne line. An inconsistency may go to the heart of the defence case. It is the role of 
prosecution counsel to re-examine if there are inconsistencies in the child’s evidence. 
Th ere is also a concern that an intermediary’s intervention after the child has 
answered could be a prompt to the child that he/she has “got it wrong”.179
Th ese concerns are understandable and it is important that intermediaries 
be well-trained and that defence counsel be given the opportunity to object 
if the intermediary’s assistance risks rendering the trial unfair. Trial judges 
can be expected to be alert to this concern in weighing the evidence in a manner 
analogous to their control of re-examination by the Crown. 
Finally, it is worth noting that all of these accommodations would properly 
be available to an accused person with a mental disability, and indeed some of the 
initiatives in other jurisdictions were designed for accused persons and in response 
to wrongful convictions. Th ese reforms have the potential to assist all witnesses 
with mental disabilities in receiving equal treatment in the criminal justice system.
178. R v TA, [2003] NSWCCA 191 at para 8, Spigelm an CJ concurring.
179. Plotnikoff  & Woolfson, supra note 138 at 55.
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VI. CONCLUSION 
It is time for Canada to take a serious look at what can be done to improve access 
to justice for witnesses with mental disabilities, as other common law countries 
with a commitment to fair trial rights for the accused have done in recent years. 
Reforms should include the use of intermediaries, provisions that require judges 
to disallow improper questions, and the continuing education of all participants 
in the criminal justice system to increase their ability to treat witnesses with mental 
disabilities equally and fairly. 
While these reforms could benefi t any witness, our focus in this article is on 
the particular importance of this issue for complainants in sexual assault trials, 
most of whom are women. We know that these women experience high rates of 
sexual assault and that they are less likely to see their cases prosecuted. Th ey face 
barriers and stereotypes, including a system for the oral testimony of witnesses 
through examination-in-chief and cross-examination that often fails to take into 
account their realities. Since the complainant’s evidence is usually essential to a 
conviction, it is particularly important that we ensure a trial process that is truly 
fair and encourages the search for truth.
